Theo Swan Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co. et al : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1955
Theo Swan Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co. et
al : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Paul H. Ray; Grant C. Aadnesen; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., No. 8246 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2277
IN THE SUPREME COURJrlr"":''-'ED 
of the STATE OF UTAH. 
·l ;, l .il . t:~~ . MAY 6 19'55 t~ ' . -~ h~ . A.-,P 
i· . .L..J ' ··"··- . 
In the Matter of the Estate "~· ·'"" Wi l•Mtt 
r\ ri R .. ;<1· /' -'i r::J) , 
of MF '\ : -' •~"'~"'-: U. ef U. 
WILDA GAIL SWAN Deceased.------- - - --:-- --_-7----· 
THEO SWAN HENDEE, ~~1 er'-'~. r~.!.p~·~Xj(W •:-ou:rtj Lt!lb 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
EXECUTOR OF THE LAST WILL AND 
TESTAMENT OF WILDA GAIL SWAN, 
Deceased; GRANT MACFARLANE; 
DANIEL KOSTOPULOS and 
Case No. 
8246 
ADA BRIDGE, 
Defendants and Appellants 
·'. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
PAUL H. RAY 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
APPENDIX Page 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ------------------------------------ 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW__ XV 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ---------------------------------------- XXX 
JrUDGMENT ____________________________________________________________ xxxiii 
STATEMENT 0 F CASE ------------------------------------------
ADA 13RIDGE ----------------------------------------------------------
T~EO ~ENDEE ------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL KOSTOPULOS ---------:-----------------------------------
GRANT MACFARLANE ------------------------------------------
A~<:i~ME~T ------------------------------------------------------------
APPELLANTS' POINTS AND A~THO~ITIES __ 
13URDEN OF PROOF ----------------------------------------------
GOODNESS OR E"IL ------------------------------------------------
COLLUSION ----------------------------------------------------------
DESTRUCTION OF WILL ----------------------------------------
APPELLANTS' CASES _____________ -------------------------------
CONCL~SION ----------------------------------------------------------
CASES CITED 
1 
20 
20 
17 
9 
24 
55 
55 
56 
56 
57 
59 
63 
Abbott v. Church, 123 N.E. 306 --------------------------------45, 53 
Bancroft v. Otis, 8 So. 2 8 6 (Ala.) ---------------------------- 53 
In re Bartle's Will, 13 Atl. ( 2d) 642, 
19 A tl. ( 2 d) 17 -------------------------------------------------- 4 7 
Bridwell v. Swank, 84 Mo. 45 5 ---------------------------------- 53 
In re Brown's Estate, 108 P. (2d) 775 ---------------------- 52 
Bryan's Estate, 82 ~tah 390, 25 P. (2d) 602 ____________ 59, 61 
Buttars Estate, 261 P. (2d) 174---------------------------------- 62 
Coghill v. Kennedy, 2 4 So. 4 59 ---------------~----------------- 40 
In re Cooper, 71 A tl. 67 6 -------------------------------------------- 53 
Davis v. Frederick, 118 S.E. 2 0 6 ( <=ia.) ---------------------- 53 
In re Doty's Estate, 201 P. (2d) 823 (Cal.) ____________ 42, 53 
In re Eldred Estate, 207 N.W. 870 (Mich.) ______________ 46 
In re Everett, 68 S.E. 924 -------------------------------------------- 52 
In re <=iallo' s Estate, 214 P. ( 2d) 49 6 -------------------------- 53 
<=ilover v. Glover, 242 P. (2d) 298, 300 ____________________ 39 
<=iott v. Dennis, 246 S. W. 218, 22 3 ---------------------------- 46 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED-Continued 
Page 
Graham v. Courtright, 161 N.W. 774 ______________________ 54 
In re Graves Estate, 259 Pac. 9 3 5 -------------------------------- 42 
Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256 ____________________ 27, 61 
Hanson's Estate 87 Utah 580, 52 Pacific (2) 
11 0 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 ' 2 4 
Hartman v. Strickler, 8 2 V a. 2 2 5 ------------------------------ 53 
Heims Estate, 40 Atl. (2d) 657 -------------------------------- 48 
In re Hotchkiss, 9 2 A tl. 419 (Conn.) ------------------------4 3, 53 
In re Hull's Estate, 14 6 P. ( 2 d) 2 4 2 -------------------------- 4 2 
Hunter v. Battiest, 192 Pac. 575 ·-------------------------------- 48 
Jardene v. Archibald, Pac. Rep. Feb. 24th, 1955, 
Adv. Sheet, 454----------------------------31, 37, 38, 40, 56, 59 
In re Johnson's Estate, 87 P. (2d) 900 ________________________ 53 
In re Kirby, 9 8 Atl. 3 49 ---------------------------------------------- 4 3 
In Re Lobb's Will, 14 P. (2d) 808, 160 P. (2d) 295 50 
McDonald v. Hewlett, 228 P. (2d) 83 ______________________ 42, 53 
McElhaney v. Jones, 72 So. 53 1 ---------------------------------- 53 
Meacham v. Allen, 262 P. (2d) 285 -------------------------- 31 
Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. (2d) 230 ____________ 59 
O'Day v. Crabb, 109 N.E. 724 ---------------------------------- 53 
Omega Investment Co. v. Woolley, 72 Utah 474, 
271 p. 797 ----------------------------------------31' 3 3' 3 7' 40, 53 
Page on Wills, 2d Ed. Vol. 1, Sec. 270, p. 123 3 ________ 54 
Peterson v. Budge, 35 Utah 596, 102 P. 211 ________ 31, 39, 40 
Peyton v. W m. Peyton, 12 3 A.L.R. 148 2 __________________ 4 3 
In re Phillipi's Estate, 172 P. (2d) 377 ________________ 42, 53, 60 
Pilcher Case, 114 Utah 72 -------------------------------------------- 29 
Pilitzer v. Chapman, 8 5 S.W. (2d) 400 ____________________ 46 
In re Raach's Will, 284 N.W. 571 ------------------------------ 54 
Roberts v. Wachter, 2 3 1 Fed. ( 2 d) 5 3 5 ____________________ 53 
In re Smith, 9 5 N.Y. 516 -------------------------------------------- 54 
Stone v. Moody, 8 4 P. 617 ------------------------------------------ 5 3 
In re Swartz, 16 A tl. ( 2d) 3 7 4 ---------------------------------- 53 
Tidholm v. Tidholm, 62 N.E. (2d) 473 ____________________ 53 
Viallet v. Con. R. & P. Co., 30 Utah 260, 84 P. 495__ 56 
Walker v. Hunter, 17 Ga. 3 64 ------------------------------------ 45 
In re Witt's Estate, 245 P. 197 ______________________________ 40, 42, 62 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
WILDA GAIL SWAN, Deceased. 
THEO SWAN HENDEE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
WALKERBANK&TRUSTCOMPANY, Case No. 8246 
EXECUTOR OF THE LAST WILL AND 
TESTAMENT OF WILDA GAIL SWAN, 
Deceased; GRANT MACFARLANE; 
DANIEL KOSTOPULOS and 
ADA BRIDGE, 
Defendants and Appellants 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
PAUL H. RAY 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a law case tried below before the court with-
out a jury. It is controlled by the rule announced by this 
court in Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, wherein it is said: 
uThis is a law case. Therefore, we cannot dis-
turb the findings if there is any competent evidence 
to support them.'' 
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The lower court's findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and judgment and its opinion are presented in the ap-
pendix which is bound herewith for the convenience of the 
court. 
The trial court heard all of the evidence and saw all of 
the exhibits. Not only did the trial court see all that is 
preserved in the record for review by this court, but saw 
and observed the witnesses. Each witness who sat before 
the court and testified was not only a purveyor of evi-
dence, he was likewise an exhibit either for or against him-
self, and it was the trial court's opportunity, obligation 
and duty to observe and evaluate each witness as such. 
The court's eve1:luation of the key witness is set forth in 
its opinion, appendix pages iv to ix. 
The ((statement of facts" in appellants' brief either 
ignores or so far slights the basic facts revealed by the evi-
dence and found by the court to be the facts of the case 
that respondent feels constrained to set them forth in ad-
vance of her argument. 
For a correct understanding of the facts upon which 
the trial court based its judgment we deem it necessary to 
set forth an integrated and consecutive statement of the 
facts, with particular attention to the facts in the record 
which describe and characterize the testatrix, the bene-
ficiaries named in the purported will, and codicils, and 
other persons closely related to her in her lifetime. It is 
the purported will and codicils of Wilda Gail Swan which 
are the subjects of this litigation. It is therefore approp-
riate to expose the facts which show her nature, person-
ality, and mentality at the times pertinent to this inquiry. 
She will hereinafter be referred to as Gail. 
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Gail was born in 1890, and died an unmarried and 
childless woman in Salt Lake City on or about May 28, 
1952. She left as her sole surviving heir at law her sister, 
Theo Swan Hendee, who is contestant and respondent in 
these proceedings. (R 129) 
The facts relating to Gail's childhood are undisputed 
and came largely from the testimony of Mrs. Bell Mart-
soff and Gail's sister, Mrs. Hendee. Gail's earliest years 
were normal so far as the record indicates, and she was en-
rolled in the public schools of Salt Lake City in 1896 when 
she was about the age of six years. (R 95) When she was 
about eight years of age she began to show symptoms of 
nervous disorder (R 95) which culminated when she was 
about 11 years of age in epilepsy manifested by frequent 
and violent seizures. (R 96, 254) Her health was so far 
impaired that it was necessary for her parents to withdraw 
her from school when she was about 11 years of age, and 
she was never thereafter well enough to resume her school-
ing. (R 95, 100) 
From and after the time Gail was withdrawn from 
school she became the particular object of her parent's care 
and attention. (R 96) Relief for her affliction was sought 
by the parents both at home and at medical centers in the 
midwest. (R 97) Her health was such that she was not 
only withdrawn from school but from all contacts which 
are normal to a growing child. (R 96, 103, 260) She was 
denied the companionship of boys and girls of her own 
age. Between the ages of 11 and 27, the years when a 
normal girl develops into womanhood and has the greatest 
desire and need for broadening social contacts, Gail was a 
physical invalid and a complete social recluse. (R 100, 
101, 260) 
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She was so far sequestered that her only companions 
were her immediate family, her Aunt Bell Martsolf, who 
was approximately the same age as her mother, and such 
persons as were from time to time employed in the house-
hold to assist in her care. (R 96, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 
109) 
Gail continued to be a victim of epilepsy to the end 
of her life, but when she was about 27 years of age medica-
tion became available which if persistently given limited 
the frequency and severity of epileptic seizures. (R 100, 
1 0 1 ) It was ne.cessary during all the balance of her life 
that she receive medication several times each day. (R 
130, 265, 448) 
It was the family custom to spend the winters in 
California and the summers in Salt Lake City. (R 96) 
Under the influence of constant medications Gail's health 
improved and from the time she was 27 until nearly the 
end of her life she was able to be up and about, except for 
temporary sicknesses, and to participate to a limited extent 
in the life of the family. Until her mother's death in 
1931 she was constantly under the sheltering influence of 
her mother. (R 96, 98, 100, 102) After her mother's 
death in California her father brought her back to Salt 
Lake and with the aid of such persons as he could employ 
he supervised the details of Gail's life, and she continued 
to be a recluse. She never had a boy friend of her own 
age and never enjoyed the acquaintance of girls or women 
of her own age. (R 103, 108, 266) 
Gail's father died in 1950 an.d she spent her last two 
years deprived of the care and attention of both of her 
parents. Normal lives develop from normal contacts. The 
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court found that Gail had never reached maturity either 
mentally or emotionally. (App. xix R 263) 
Five doctors were sworn and testified, three called by 
the defendants and two by contestant. All of the medical 
evidence was to the effect that Gail had the mind of a 
child. (R 389, 465, 811, 812, 826, 827, 828, 829.) Her 
mental development was given by Dr. Alvin Darke, a 
psychiatrist called by the defendants, as that of a child 12 
years of age. (R 808) On direct examination Dr. Niel-
son testified that Gail's mental capacity was adult, but 
upon cross examination, he admitted that he had been 
present during Dr. Darke's examination and that he con-
curred in Dr. Darke's conclusion that Gail's mental de-
velopment had been arrested and that her mentality was 
that of a child in the age bracket 11 to 13. (R 843) 
The evidence of medical experts was supported by 
that of Mrs. Grace Foulden, who had been a trained nurse 
for more than 30 years, and who was nurse and companion 
to Gail for many months. (R 402, 413) 
From the long list of lay witnesses there came abund-
ant testimony of Gail's immaturity, both mentally and 
emotionally. 
Typical of lay testimony which the trial court had 
every right to believe, is the following from Gail's aunt, 
Bell Martsolf, who was close to Gail nearly all the years of 
her life: 
c:c:* * ::· I wrote a candid letter to my niece. 
uQ. Which niece? 
c:c:A. This one here (indicating). Only had 
those two. 
uQ. You refer to the one here as your niece, 
and one as your child? 
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u.A. Gail has always been a child to me; be-
cause of her condition she was never normal, never 
grew up like the rest of us; she couldn't be." (R. 
284) 
The combination of mental and emotional weakness 
resulting from long years of sickness rendered Gail especial-
ly susceptible to any show of kindness from strangers, 
especially male strangers. 
In the year 1937 Gail was introduced to the witness 
William L. Corbett. She had known the woman who later 
became Mr. Corbett's wife for many years but had never 
before met Corbett. Within a few minutes after their 
meeting she became attracted to Mr. Corbett and proposed 
that he become the manager of_ her properties. (R 542) 
Jack Forsberg had been employed by Gail's father 
to keep the family properties in repair and to assist in the 
collection of rents. Through that employment he became 
acquainted with Gail. Gail gave him $3,000.00 (R 212, 
273) Somehow information respecting that gift became 
known to Gail's father. He was angered by such infor-:-
mation and required Forsberg to return the money. 
(R 271, 272, 273) 
Management of the Swan family property was re-
posed in Walker Bank & Trust Company. (R 215-216) 
The officers of the bank who had contact with Gail were 
Joseph Fitzpatrick and Clair Mortenson. In the course 
of managing the property they became acquainted with 
Gail and were kind and courteous to her. She proposed 
to Mr. Fitzpatrick that he be made beneficiary of part of 
her property in her will. (R 667) He explained that he 
could not accept any such arrangement, whereupon she 
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proposed that Fitzpatrick's wife be made a beneficiary. 
To that alternative Fitzpatrick demurred and explained 
that it would be embarrassing to him if either he or his 
wife were made beneficiary in her will. (R 667) She 
then proposed to Mr. Mortenson that he become a devisee 
under her will. He, like Fitzpatrick, made it plain that 
he could not accept any such arrangement, and that it 
would be embarrassing to him to be named as a beneficiary 
in her will. (R 506) On at least two occasions Gail stated 
to Dr. Frank that she would have her will drawn so that 
he would be a beneficiary. ( R 464) 
By 1944 Gail was well enough to participate in the 
collection of rentals upon the family property. During 
the fall of that year she became acquainted with appellant, 
Grant Macfarlane, whom she called upon for legal advice. 
(R 187> 188) From that time until her death the relation-
ship of attorney and client existed between her and Mac-
farlane. (R 187 to 198) The details of the relationship 
between Gail and Macfarlane are of dominating import-
ance in these proceedings, but will be set forth in greater 
length in connection with the facts relating to Macfarlane. 
Gail first met Dan Kostopulos, who was the operator 
of a moving picture theatre in Salt Lake City, about the 
year 1933. (R 318) Kostopulos was 14 or 15 years young-
er than Gail, and his acquaintance was of a casual nature 
until about the year 1949, six or eight months prior to the 
death of Gail's father. (R 328) At that time Kostopulos 
began calling frequently at Gail's home, and for the last 
two years of Gail's life he was a daily visitor. (R 320, 591) 
Further details with respect to the relationship between 
Gail and Kostopulus will be supplied in connection with 
the separate discussion of Kostopulos. 
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Joseph Lamar Bridge was a plaster contractor. 
(R 636) He had a wife and six children and a home in 
Salt Lake County, south of Salt Lake City. (R 637) He 
was in the military service during the war. While he 
was away his wife sold and delivered poultry products to 
customers in Salt Lake City. Among her customers was 
the· Swan family. (R 604) In the course of her business 
Mrs. Bridge became acquainted with Gail and often 
stopped to visit. Upon his return from the service Mr. 
Bridge began accompanying his wife to the Swan home. 
While the Bridges were young enough to be children of 
Gail, (R 608) and while they had a family of six, (R 607) 
a plastering business, and a chicken farm, they managed 
to see Gail on an average of three times a week during the 
last two years of Gail's life. (R 63 8) During that period 
they showed kindness to Gail. They were in the process 
of building a house and Gail offered to give Bridge 
· $3,000.00. (R 642) His testimony was that he declined, 
to accept· it as a gift, but he accompanied Gail to the 
Union Bank and Trust Company, where she drew from 
savings $3,000.00 and handed it to Bridge in exchange for 
a ((receipt" which Bridge said he wrote out, but which 
could not be produced at the trial. (R 643, 644) Ac-
cording to Bridge, the receipt or note provided for no in-
terest and :fixed no time for repayment. At least $1700.00 
of the $3,000.00 was credited upon the note as gifts from 
Gail. (R 646) The details of this transaction are set forth 
in connection with the :findings of the court that Gail was 
easily susceptible to those who attached themselves to her. 
While Ada Bridge is no longer a party to these proceed-
ings, it is necessary to have them in mind because they 
complete the group which surrounded Gail during the 
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two years following her father's death: Macfarlane, Kosto-
pulos and the Bridges. 
GRANT MACFARLANE 
Most of the facts relating to the relationship between 
Macfarlane and Miss Swan, and to the preparation of the 
documents under attack in this proceeding, came from 
Macfarlane himself. 
At the time of the trial Macfarlane had been engaged 
in the active practice of the law for 25 years, (R 186) 
and had at the same time been engaged in business and 
commercial enterprises. The court found that Macfarlane 
was possessed of an attra.ctive and ingratiating person-
ality. App. xix. 
From the fall of 1944 until Gail's death he continued 
to be Gail's attorney at law. (R 187, 189-197) Gail 
called frequently at his office, sometimes seeking advice 
in connection with business matters and sometimes seek-
ing only the companionship of Macfarlane. (R 190) 
She placed full co:fidence in Macfarlane both as her at-
torney at law and as her friend and he knew that such 
confidence was reposed. (R 195) In the year 1945 Mac-
farlane called at Gail's home where he was made acquainted 
with Gail's aged father. (R 141) Following that visit a 
friendship developed between Macfarlane and Gail's fa-
ther, and Macfarlane was entrusted with Mr. Swan's legal 
problems. Thus a confidential relationship arose between 
Macfarlane and Mr. Swan. (R 191) 
During the years Macfarlane visited in Gail's home 
from time to time, and in the course of his relationship 
with Gail he became acquainted with Gail's sister who 
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lived in San Francisco, but made frequent visits to Salt 
Lake City and the family home. (R 193) 
Macfarlane suffered an injury to one of his eyes which 
required surgery and hospitalization. He was treated in 
San Francisco and while there was shown many courtesies 
by Mrs. Hendee and her husband. (R 199) A friendship 
developed between Macfarlane and Mrs. Hendee. Mrs. 
Hendee reposed full confidence in him. (R 198) He 
knew that she had confidence in him and that she and her 
father depended upon him to protect Gail and her in-
terests. (R, 19 8) 
For all legal services rendered by Macfarlane to either 
Gail or her father, Macfarlane sent bills and was paid the 
reasonable value of his services. (R 241) 
After Gail's death there were admitted to probate a 
purported will dated May 2, 1947, a codicil dated February 
20, 1950, and a codicil dated April 23, 1951. Within the 
time provided by law respondent and contestant filed her 
complaint and contest which is here under review. The 
will, as stated above, is dated May 2, 1947. At that time 
Macfarlane had been Gail's attorney at law for nearly 
three years. The confidential relationship thus arising had 
not only persisted for three years, but had been fortified 
by friendly non-professional contacts from time to time. 
The court found that on the date the will was written 
Macfarlane must have been aware of Gail's immaturity, 
both mentally and emotionally. App. xix. He also found 
from the evidence given by Macfarlane that Gail had 
been emotionally upset because of Macfarlane's illness and 
the expense attendant upon surgical treatment and hos-
pitalization. App. xxiii (R 236) 
The will was drawn by Macfarlane in his own office. 
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(R 202) Gail went there entirely alone. (R 203) She 
brought with her a prior will. The will was not produced 
upon the trial, but Macfarlane testified that by its terms 
Gail's estate was bequeathed and devised to her fa-
ther. (R 202) Macfarlane then and there dictated the 
will now under attack and caused it to be attested by two 
witnesses of his own selection-one of whom was his pri-
vate secretary, the other a stranger to Gail. (R 204) By 
the terms of the will Macfarlane was made beneficiary 
of property having a value of approximately $100,000.00 
representing more than one-third of the entire estate. 
Ex-(R 664) 
At the time the will was prepared by Macfarlane and 
executed by Gail, she had no independent advice of any 
kind. Macfarlane offered no suggestion that she should 
seek advice from anyone else. (R 205, 211) She relied, 
and he knew she relied, solely upon his advice. (205, 211, 
206) 
The first codicil admitted to probate and now under 
attack is dated February 20, 1950. At that time Macfar-
lane had been Gail's attorney at law for approximately 6 
years. Between the signing of the will and the first 
codicil, a matter of nearly three years, Macfarlane had con-
tinued to be the attorney at law and confidential friend 
of Gail. She continued to be a frequent visitor at his of-
fice, and he continued from time to time to visit her home. 
The court found that there was no interruption in or 
weakening of the confidential relationship existing be-
tween Gail and Macfarlane during the years following the 
execution of the purported will. (App. xxi~) 
When the first codicil was written Gail again called 
at Macfarlane's office entirely alone. (R 206) Macfar-
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lane then and there prepared the first codicil and had it 
attested by his secretary and a lawyer who occupied space 
in the same suite. (R 206, 207) The lawyer who witnessed 
the will is Irwin Clawson. Macfarlane testified that Claw-
son did not read the will or hear it read. Clawson was 
sworn as a witness by appellant but did not testify that he 
had ever given any advice to Gail upon any subject what-
ever. 
As in the case of the purported will, Gail had no in-
dependent advice of any kind, and Macfarlane testified 
that he offered no suggestion that she have independent 
advice, and that he assumed that she had had none. (R 207) 
By the codicil Macfarlane was designated as the beneficiary 
of property worth more than $100,000.00 
By April 1950 Gail's father had been overtaken by 
his final illness which culminated in his death in the fol-
lowing June. In April 1950, two months after the sign-
ing of the first codicil, Macfarlane prepared and caused 
Gail to sign and deliver to him a full and general power of 
attorney, making him her attorney in fact. (R 229-230) 
The acceptance of a general power of attorney from Gail 
must have been born of a consciousness upon the part of 
Macfarlane that Gail was in need of care and attention be-
yond that contemplated by the ordinary attorney and 
client relationship. It could have resulted from Gail's 
knowledge of her own lack of capacity. In either case, it 
is proof of the extraordinary confidence Gail had in Mac-
farlane. The obligation thus imposed upon Macfarlane 
was commensurate with the trust bestowed. Macfarlane 
was examined as an adverse witness, and upon being inter-
rogated about the power of attorney stated that except for 
the manipulation of certain savings accounts in Union 
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Trust Company in Salt Lake City, (R 230) and except 
for his participation in the execution and delivery of a 
lease, he had not exercised any of the powers granted to 
him by Gail. (R 234) He was thereafter confronted 
with certain documents (Exhibits 16, 17, 10) after which 
he made a disclosure of the extent to which he had exer-
cised his powers as attorney in fact. 
He participated in the sale of certain unimproved 
real estate belonging to Gail. (R 242) Following the sale 
of the real estate certain securities were acquired by Gail. 
They consisted of $3,000.00 par value of United States 
Government bonds, 100 shares of Utah Power and Light 
Company stock, and 80 shares of Westinghouse Electric. 
The securities thus acquired were delivered to Walker 
Bank and Trust Company for Gail's account. (R 236) 
In April 1951, as Gail's attorney in fact, Macfarlane 
withdrew the securities above referred to. (R 136) He 
caused the 100 shares of Utah Power and Light stock to 
be transferred into the name of Daniel Kostopulos, and 
the 8 0 shares of Westinghouse Electric stock to be trans-
ferred to his own name. (R 236, 237) He permitted Gail 
to deliver the Utah Power and Light stock to Dan Kosta-
pulos, who sold the same and retained the proceeds for 
himself (R 325, 327) The $3,000.00 of U. S. Govern-
ment bonds were divided equally between Macfarlane and 
Kostopulos. (R 239, 327) As far as the record shows, 
Gail never owned or possessed any interest-bearing securi-
ties except those just referred to. (R 2 3 9, 3 27) 
The year following the death of Gail's father, Mac-
farlane as attorney in fact caused certain changes to be 
made with respect to funds belonging to Gail and upon 
deposit in Union Trust Company, Salt Lake City. (R 231) 
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The funds totalled approximately $20,000.00. After the 
changes were made by Macfarlane as attorney in fact, 
$4797.50 stood in the bank in the name of Gail Swan and 
Grant Macfarlane, and the same amount in the name of 
Gail Swan and Daniel Kostopulos and his wife. (R 232, 
233) Neither Macfarlane nor Kostopulos had any in-
terest in the balance of the funds upon deposit. Between 
the time when the savings accounts were thus adjusted 
and Gail's death the accounts not in the name of Macfar-
lane or Kostopulos were substantially exhausted while the 
accounts in the name of Macfarlane and Kostopulos re-
mained substantially unimpaired. (R 232, 233) At the 
time of Gail's death the amounts still on deposit in the 
names of Macfarlane and Kostopulos were the same-
$4,597.17. (R 232, 233) 
Macfarlane also participated in the granting of a 
long-term lease by Gail to Dan Kostopulos covering a valu-
able piece of real estate on South State Street in Salt Lake 
City. (R 250) 
The second and last codicil is dated A pral 2, 19 51. 
By then Macfarlane had been Gail's attorney at law and 
confidential friend and business adviser for nearly seven 
years. The confidential nature of their relationship had 
grown stronger with the passage of years, and Gail's trust 
and confidence in Macfarlane was complete. At that time 
he had been Gail's attorney in fact for one year. The 
court found that her arrested mental and emotional de-
velopment must have been obvious to Macfarlane. 
(App. xxvi) 
At the time the second codicil was drawn a confi-
dential relationship had existed between Gail and Kosto-
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pulos for more than two years, during which Kostopulos 
had made almost daily visits to Gail seeing her often enough 
that there could never be any relaxation or deterioration 
of the relationship between them. (R 591) 
Macfarlane drew the second codicil. (R 208) It was 
drawn under circumstances substantially the same as those 
surrounding the preparation of the will and the first 
codicil. Here again Gail came alone. (R 210) She had 
no independent advice and no suggestion from Macfarlane 
that she should seek independent advice. (R 210, 211) 
There was, however, a departure from previous procedure. 
It is clear that prior to the execution of the second codicil 
doubt had arisen as to Gail's testamentary capacity. Mac-
farlane testified that it was Gail who suggested the desira-
bility of a medical examination, but from all the circum-
stances the court found that it was Macfarlane who saw 
the advantage of medical witnesses. Gail had been under 
the care of Dr. William Pace, a psychiatrist, and her family 
physician was Dr. Emery Frank, who was thoroughly fa-
miliar with Gail's condition. Macfarlane called upon 
neither Pace nor Frank in connection with the execution 
of the codicil. Macfarlane arranged to have an examina-
tion made by Dr. A.M. Nielson. (R 837, 838) He then 
arranged to have Kostopulos call at Gail's home and bring 
her to Dr. Nielson,s office where Macfarlane was waiting 
with the will. (R 3 31) Dr. Nielson made a physical ex-
amination. (R 838) He then called in Dr. Roy A. Darke, 
a psychiatrist, and the two of them examined Gail Swan 
and then signed the second codicil as attesting witnesses. 
(R 839) Macfarlane and Kostopulos were both present 
when the second codicil was signed but were not present 
during some of the conversations between the doctors and 
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Gail. When they were not in the actual presence of Gail 
they were in the adjoining room. (R 3 31) 
Upon direct examination Drs. Darke and Nielson 
both testified that Gail was competent to sign the codicil 
for the reason that she clearly understood the nature of her 
property, and clearly understood the persons who were 
to benefit by her will. They both testified that upon in-
quiry as to who were to be beneficiaries under her will she 
gave them the names of seven persons: Oscar Burnside 
Beam, her brother-in-law Harold C. Hundee, Joseph La-
mar Bridge, Ada Bridge, Theo Hendee, Grant Macfarlane 
and Dan Kostopulos. The names of her intended bene-
ficiaries were given to the doctors as she was about to sign 
the codicil which is here under attack. (R 807, 843) An 
inspection of the codicil will disclose that three of the sev-
en beneficiaries named by the testatrix were omitted from 
the codicil. Immediately following the examination of 
Gail and the execution of the second codicil, Dr. Darke 
mailed his written report to Macfarlane, in which he stated 
that Gail had named the seven persons above listed as her 
intended beneficiaries. (R 807) Macfarlane did not deny 
the receipt of Dr. Drake's report and did not claim that 
he ever took the matter up with Gail to clear up the omis-
sion of the three names. 
It is significant to note that at the time Macfarlane 
prepared the first codicil, by which he would be enriched 
by more than $100,000.00, he was a defendant in a case 
pending in the Third Judicial District Court in which he 
was accused of preparing the Last Will and Testament of 
one Becker, whereby he became a principal beneficiary. 
In that proceeding he was accused of abusing his confi-
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dential relationship and procuring Becker's will by fraud 
and undue influen.ce~ (R 221) 
DANIEL KOSTOPULOS 
Daniel Kostopulos was a witness in his own behalf. 
He was observed by the court as he testified, and the court 
in his evaluation of his credibility concluded that he was 
not worthy of belief. From his testimony it appears that 
he first became acquainted with Gail about 19 3 3. (R 318) 
He did not become a frequent visitor in the Swan home 
until near the end of Mr. Swan's life. (R 320) During 
the last two and a half years of Gail's life, and the last six 
months of her father's life, Kostopulos was a constant 
visitor at the Swan home. (R 320) He frequently drove 
Gail on errands, ( R 3 2 5) and often took groceries or other 
things to Gail's home. He testified that his attention to 
Gail and the numerous small gifts made to her were done 
purely out of charity for one who seemed to be in need 
of help. (R 326) He stated that she was in need of money 
from time to time and that he made small loans to her. 
(R 341) 
In 1951, after her father's death, Kostopulos accepted 
from Gail 100 shares of Utah Power and Light stock 
(R 325) and $1500.00 par value of U. S. Government 
bonds. (R 327) During the time that he was making 
daily visits to the Swan home he was keeping a detailed 
account of all the small loans made and all purchases made 
in behalf of Gail. ( R 3 3 6) Upon her death he filed a 
claim against her estate for $2,000.00, and when the ex-
ecutor refused to pay it he brought suit. (R 336) As 
time went on and his relationship with Gail grew closer 
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and closer, he undertook to alienate from Gail's affection 
not only Gail's sister, Mrs. Hendee, but other persons close-
ly identified with Gail's life. His daily visits to the home 
kept him fully aware of all the details of Gail's life, and he 
knew in advance from time to time when Gail's sister, 
Theo, was about to make a visit from San Francisco. (R 
461-462) On many occasions just prior to such a visit 
he took Gail to her attending physician, D. Emory Frank. 
He told Dr. Frank that Mrs. Hendee was coming to Salt 
Lake and suggested to Dr. Frank that he ((dope up Gail" 
to the point she uwould be very quiet" while her sister was 
visiting. (R 462) 
While Gail was hospitalized for her final illness, her 
sister was in close attendance upon her at the hospital. 
Kostopulos induced Dr. Frank to the belief that Gail was 
made nervous and unhappy by her sister's presence. Mrs. 
Hendee complied with Dr. Frank's request and remained 
away from the hospital for two or three days. Dr. Frank 
then learned that Gail's greatest desire was to have her sis-
ter by her bedside, after which he asked Mrs. Hendee to 
resume her attendance at the hospital. (R 457, 458) Dur-
ing her last days her only requests were that her sister be 
nearby. (R 457, 458, 459 and 460) 
He resented the close companionship developed be-
tween Ada Bridge and her husband on the one hand and 
Gail on the other. On the occasion of one of Mrs. Hen-
dee's visits Kostopulos suggested that she should put a stop 
to the association between Gail and Bridges ((because the 
Bridges are getting too mu.ch money from Gail." (R 183-
184. 
Kostopulos disliked the supervision of Gail by the 
trained nurse, Mrs. Foulden. Accordingly, he took Mac-
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farlane to the office of Dr. Frank and there persuaded Dr. 
Frank that it would be in the best interest of Gail's health 
if Mrs. Foul den should be discharged. (R 454) 
Kostopulos denied some of the facts above set forth, 
but they were testified to under oath by other witnesses 
whom the court had the right to believe as against the 
testimony of Kostopulos. 
Kostopulos testified that he never knew he was to be 
a beneficiary under Gail's will until after Gail's death. 
(R 332) Against such testimony is the evidence that 
Kostopulos was present when the second codicil was read 
and signed. (R 3 3 2) Against this testimony also was the 
testimony of Arvid Butler, a wholly disinterested witness. 
Butler testified that during Gail's life he had inquired of 
Kostopulos how he was doing in the motion picture busi-
ness and Kostopulos answered that he wasn't worried about 
the motion picture business because a rich woman was go-
ing to leave him a hotel. (R 355) Thereafter he identified 
Gail Swan to Mr. Butler as the rich woman who was go-
ing to leave him a hotel. ( R 3 57, 3 5 8 ) It is the first codicil 
which refers to the devise to Kostopulos as a hotel. Where-
fore, it was entirely competent for the court to find that 
Kostopulos knew about the first codicil, and from that time 
on expected to inherit the hotel on West Broadway. Such 
expectation would be realized if he saw to it that his con-
fidential relationship and control over Gail was not al-
lowed to deteriorate. 
Kostopulos also told Butler after Gail's death that 
Macfarlane had made a mistake when he eliminated Mr. 
Beam from the will. (R 359) It was entirely competent 
for the court to conclude that Kostopulos made such state-
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ment because he knew it was Gail's intention to provide 
for Mr. Beam. 
ADA BRIDGE 
While Ada Bridge is no longer a party to these pro-
ceedings, it is important to see what the record reveals 
with respect to her and her husband. 
When we have pointed out the facts with respect to 
Macfarlane, Kostopulos, the Bridges and Mrs. Hendee, we 
. will have covered all persons closely identified with Gail, 
except for nurses and hired companions. 
Mrs. Bridge and her husband were almost young 
enough to be the .children of Gail. (R 63 5, 63 8, 608) 
They· had domestic and business concerns and friends of 
their own age ample to absorb all of their time and atten-
tion. Notwithstanding this, they made three trips a week 
from the south end of the county to go to Gail's home on 
the north side of Salt Lake City, (R 638) and frequently 
had Gail at their own home. (R 606) We have hereto-
fore set forth the facts with respect to the so-called loan 
of $3,000.00 from Gail to Mr. Bridge. The Bridges, like 
Kostopulos permitted nothing to interfere with the per-
sistence of their visits. Neither participated in the execu-
tion of the will or either codicil. 
THEO SWAN HENDEE 
Theo Swan Hendee is the sole surviving heir at law 
of Gail Swan, and is respondent and contestant in these 
proceedings. (R 129, 30) She was two or three years older 
than Gail, and in all respects normal, mentally and phys-
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ically. She began her early schooling at the Wasatch 
school in Salt Lake City, (R 96) but because the family 
spent its winters in California she was enrolled in a high 
school in southern California. (R 96) In due time she 
was graduated from Vassar College (R 98) and there-
after did postgraduate work at the University of Utah. 
After finishing college she taught in a high school in Idaho. 
She was married to Harold Hendee in 1914. (R 98) He 
was engaged in newspaper business in Michigan until 1922 
when he and Theo moved to San Francisco. (R 99) They 
never had any children. Mr. Hendee continued in the 
newspaper business until his death which occurred within 
a few days of the death of Gail Swan. (R 126) At the 
time of his death, and for many years prior thereto, Mr. 
Hendee had been associated in an editorial capacity with 
the West Coast Division of the Wall Street Journal. The 
evidence in the record is that Mr. Hendee never accumu-
lated any wealth and that Mrs. Hendee never inherited 
anything substantial from him. (R 848) 
During all the years that Mrs. Hendee lived in San 
Francisco she made frequent visits to Salt Lake City. On 
the occasion of such visits she lived at the family home and 
helped out with family affairs, including domestic and 
business concerns. (R 105, 108, 110-115) In between visits 
she wrote frequently and often telephoned. (R 107, 112) 
She consulted with her father upon business affairs of the 
family, and with the several banking institutions which, 
from time to time, had the family business in charge. (R 
121, 158) Gail was not a frequent visitor at Mrs. Hendee's 
home in California. Mrs. Hendee testified that Gail was de-
pendent for guidance and companionship upon her father, 
and that her father so disliked the climate of northern Cali-
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fornia that he would not go there. Bell Martsolf was the 
aunt of Gail and Mrs. Hendee. She lived in Redlands, 
California. All through the years from time to time Mrs. 
Hendee paid the expenses of Mrs. Martsolf so that she 
might go from Redlands to Salt Lake City and be with 
and give aid and comfort to Gail and her father. (R Ill) 
The record shows that the women closest to Gail dur-
ing the last few years of her life were Mrs. Ada Bridge, one 
of the defendants below, Mrs. Emory Frank, wife of the 
family doctor, and Mrs. Ruth Corbett, daughter of an 
old friend and companion of the Swan family. Each 
testified with respect to the relationship between Gail and 
her sister, Theo. 
In the testimony of Ruth Corbett this appears at 515 
on the record: 
uQ. Did you observe whether or not Theo and 
Gail had a pleasant relationship?" 
u.A. Very affectionate." 
In the testimony of Vinita Frank at 510 and 512 of 
the record this appears: 
uQ. Did Gail ever talk about Theo to you? 
u.A. Yes. 
uQ. What did she say? 
c'"A. She liked her. 
uQ. She told you that? 
u.A. Yes. 
uQ. Did she tell you of Theo's com1ng to 
visit? 
u.A. Yes. 
u.Q. What did she say? 
ccA. She was very happy she was coming. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
uQ. Did you observe the relationship between 
Theo and Gail? 
uA. Y es. 
((Q. What kind of relationship was it? 
((A. Very affectionate." 
Defendant Ada Bridge when asked whether she was 
close to Gail answered, uShe claimed to be a part of our 
family." (R 609) She later testified that ((the relationship 
between Gail and Theo was very good." (R 620) 
Upon the question of the relationship between Gail 
and her sister some illumination may be had from an ex-
amination of the will and the codicils. They were writ-
ten and their execution supervised by Macfarlane. He ad-
mitted that the language of all three documents was his, 
and (R. 222) that he supplied the adjectives. In the will 
and in both the codicils Gail's sister is referred to as ((my 
beloved sister, Theo Swan Hendee." Macfarlane stated 
that the term ubeloved" was introduced into each of the 
documents by him. (R 222) Macfarlane had an intimate 
knowledge of Gail and knew her sister well. Surely the 
court was fully justified in :finding that Macfarlane knew 
that in Gail's heart there was an abiding affection for Theo. 
At the close of the case after both sides had rested and 
the trial court had heard arguments of counsel, both oral 
and written, he made and :filed his opinion and thereafter 
signed and :filed his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment, whereby he adjudged that at the time the 
contested will and codicils were made Gail lacked testa-
mentary capacity to make them, and that they were made 
as the result of fraud and undue influence practiced upon 
her by Macfarlane and Kostopulos. 
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ARGUMENT 
With respect to Gail's testamentary capacity we are 
willing to here repeat the statement we made in our memo-
randum to the trial court, that the proof of lack of testa-
mentary capacity in the record is less compelling than that 
of undue influence. If Gail's mental capacity could have 
been considered in a vacuum wholly unrelated to the cir-
cumstances of her life and the pressure and influences 
which were exerted upon her, one might conclude that she 
had mentality enough to understand her property and se-
lect those to whom she desired to bequeath it. 
This case is in some of its aspects much like In Re 
Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 Pac. (2d) 1103. At the 
end of its opinion in that case this court said: 
((While there may be some doubt as to whether 
the decedent lacked testamentary capacity, there is 
no doubt but that it was a mind easily capable of 
being influenced. The evidence relating to Marie's 
mentality and general nervous control is therefore 
material and of aid not only in determining testa-
mentary capacity, but to determine what sort of 
a subject Dr. McDonald had to play upon." 
It has been established in this case beyond any reason-
able dispute that Gail was of simple and childish mind and 
of subnormal emotional development. She was a weak and 
ready subject for the play of influence by Macfarlane and 
Kostopulos. As stated by this court in the Hanson case, a 
strong mind might have withstood the influence of Mac-
farlane and Kostopulos, but Gail's childish and susceptible 
mind gave way to the influence of those who occupied a 
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confidential relationship toward her, and once it had yield-
ed to the strong minds of those about her she no longer had 
a testamentary capacity. 
Evidence of her inability to persist in any mental de-
cision was made clear by the testimony of Dr. Darke. Just 
before she signed the second codicil she gave to Dr. Darke 
and Dr. Nielson the names of those whom she expected to 
be her beneficiaries. She named seven persons, who were 
to be the objects of her bounty, and yet almost immediate-
ly thereafter put her signature to a document by which 
she eliminated three of those seven persons. 
With respect to the finding of the court that the will 
and the codicils resulted from the fraud and undue in-
fluence of the defendants, Macfarlane and Kostopulas, our 
research has taught us that no court of last resort has ever 
held that facts such as those related above are insufficient 
to sustain a judgment setting aside a will. On the con-
trary, testamentary documents such as those here under 
attack in similar circumstances have been universally con-
demned by the courts. 
Macfarlane was a mature and seasoned lawyer and 
business man. He was Gail's attorney at law, her attorney 
in fact and her confidential friend. Gail, on the other 
hand, was a childish and simple woman lacking in normal 
emotional development. She bestowed upon him and he 
accepted her full confidence. Macfarlane prepared and 
supervised the execution of her will and both codicils by 
which he would enrich himself to the extent of approx-
imately $100,000.00, or substantially more than one-third 
of her entire estate. 
Not only was Gail the weak one and Macfarlane the 
strong one, but in connection with the execution of the 
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purported will and codicils she had no independent advice. 
No such advice was ever suggested, and Gail relied solely 
upon the advice of her beneficiary. 
Kostopulos was Gails confidential friend. She be-
stowed upon him and he accepted her full confidence. He 
participated in the execution of the second codicil by which 
he also would be enriched to the amount of approximately 
$100,000.00. 
The foregoing are the essential or basic facts of the 
case and they cannot be evaporated or combed out of the 
record by resort to any legal or equitable phraseology or 
nomenclature. They are fa~ts, not inferences or presump-
tions. Being the facts of the case they lead to certain legal 
results. As to what those legal results are, our views and 
those of appellants are in direct conflict. 
Appellants admit that the facts of the case give rise 
to a presumption of undue influence because of the con-
fidential relationship existing between Gail and the de-
fendants, but they assert that as soon as Macfarlane and 
Kostopulos testified respecting the execution of the testa-
mentary documents the probative force of the facts above 
referred to, as well as any presumption produced thereby, 
vanished and nothing remained in the case to sustain a 
judgment for contestants. 
Our contention is that the facts above recited are so 
~ull of weight and substance, and are of such probative 
force, that they compel a conclusion of fraud and undue 
influence until the absence of such vices is affirmatively 
and clearly shown by the defense. 
Upon filing her contest alleging fraud and undue in-
fluence contestant assumed the burden of proof. In dis-
charge of that burden she made proof of the basic facts 
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above detailed. When such proof was made the burden 
was then cast upon defendants to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence the absence of fraud and undue influence. 
It was up to the trial court as the trier of the facts to de-
termine whether defendant had furnished the necessary 
proof. Death had stilled the tongue of Gail, and the trial 
court was not required to accept the mere statement of 
Macfarlane or Kostopulos with respect to the presence or 
absence of fraud or undue influence. The trial court was 
at liberty and he was charged with the duty of evaluating 
the credibility of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, and weigh-
ing the quantum and the quality of their evidence against 
the facts which so powerfully bespeak the exercise of fraud 
and undue influence. The rule just stated and for which 
we here contend has been announced by many courts of 
last resort, and except for one or two possible exceptions 
to which we will refer they are unanimous in supporting 
our position. 
It is appropriate to first give consideration to the de-
cisions of this court. No will case has been before this court 
involving facts comparable to those contained in the record 
just now under review. The nearest is the case of In Re 
Hanson's Will, supra. This court had no difficulty in 
that case in sustaining a finding of the lower court that the 
will was the product of undue influence. 
It is contended by appellants in their brief, and the 
contention is much labored, that the presumption vanishes 
when evidence comes into the case. By their argument 
they would induce the court to rule that no matter how 
close the confidential relationship, no matter how weak the 
one bestowing confidence, and no matter how strong the 
other, a court or jury would be unable to find the existence 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
of undue influence if the beneficiary of the confidential 
relationship should simply deny the existence of fraud or 
undue influence. Such a ruli~g would be controry to all 
the authority upon the subject and to the sound social pol-
icy of maintaining decent confidential relationshi:(js. Appel-
lants' position, if accepted, would result in an adjudication 
that any presumption created by the facts disappears when 
there is testimony relating to the subject. That such is 
not the law is perfectly obvious. 
Approached from some directions the meaning and 
effect of a presumption may seem to be altogether illusive, 
but there is no need for confusion in the application of the 
law to the facts of this case. This court's prior decisions 
and the abundant and almost unanimous authority from 
other jurisdictions leaves the matter clear. The legal results 
flowing from the relationship between the parties to this 
proceeding have been clearly recognized. Whether those 
results were referred to as presumptions is of no import-
ance. The basic facts proven are of such substance and of 
such probative value that their establishment must result 
in the conviction that undue influence has been exercised, 
and such conviction can be dissipated and overcome only 
by clear and satisfactory proof that there was no undue 
influence. 
Appellants refer to the legal result as a presumption 
and then argue that because such result is a presumption 
it vanishes from the case and cannot be weighed by the 
court in arriving at the court's conclusion. Some pre-
sumptions may disappear as soon as evidence of the facts 
is introduced, but many do not so disappear but persist to 
the very end. It depends upon their nature and their 
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quality, and upon the fact, or the absence of facts which 
give rise to their existence. 
Perhaps the most widely knqwn of all presumptions is 
the presumption of innocence which clings to a defendant 
charged with crime from the beginning to the end of the 
case. It takes proof beyond all reasonable doubt to over-
come that presumption. 
We will a little later refer to the many cases from 
other jurisdictions which have dealt with the situation pre-
sented by the evidence in this case. For the moment we 
desire to discuss the law of presumptions as announced by 
this Court. There is an exhaustive discussion of the sub-
ject by Mr. Justice Wade in his concurring opinion in the 
Pilcher case ( 114 Utah 72, 84). In that case it appears 
that Pilcher married Mabel in Lyon County, Kansas, in 
19 0 1. Children were born to the couple but Pilcher and 
Mabel separated and lived apart for many years. In 1941 
Pilcher married Mildred in Logan, Utah. Pilcher there-
after died and Mildred, representing herself to be the sur-
viving widow, applied for and received letters of admin-
istration. In the course of the administration of the estate 
a son of Mabel came from California to Logan and made 
a settlement with Mildred whereby he received $3,000.00 
from the estate for himself and his brothers and sisters. 
Thereafter Mildred filed her final account and petition for 
distribution. At that point Mabel filed her petition claim-
ing that she was the surviving widow of Pilcher and asking 
that she be substituted as administratrix. She testified 
that she had never brought any divorce proceedings against 
Pilcher, and that she had never been served with any papers 
in any action instituted by Pilcher. She further testified 
that she had seen Pilcher not long before his death and that 
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Pilcher had told her that he had never divorced her. Mil-
dred, on the other hand, testified that he had stated to her 
that he had divorced Mabel. The lower court, believing 
that Mabel was the surviving widow of Pilcher, entered 
its order discharging Mildred as administratrix and ap-
pointing Mabel. Upon appeal it was contended by Mil-
dred that there was a presumption that her marriage to 
Pilcher in Logan in 1941 was a valid marriage which could 
be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, and 
that Mabel had failed to produce any such proof. 
This Court agreed with Mildred and reversed the low-
er court. In its final conclusion this court stated that 
there was a presumption of validity which attached to the 
marriage ceremony between Pilcher and Mildred, and he 
closed with this sentence: ((Such presumption persists until 
it is overcome by clear, convincing and conclusive evi-
dence." 
The decision in the Pilcher case is a conclusive answer 
to the suggestion of the defendants that the presumption 
of undue influence has vanished from the instant case. One 
reason why this court assigned persistent vitality to the 
presumption of marriage is that such a presumption is 
socially desirable. It is socially desirable that persons in 
confidential and dominating relationship with subnormal 
people should not be allowed to capitalize upon that re-
lationship. 
It is especially desirable socially that the standards of 
members of the bar be maintained at such a level that 
clients may repose full confidence in their lawyers with-
out fear that that confidence might be abused. It is note-
worthy that this court in the Pilcher case ruled that to 
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overcome a socially desirable presumption the evidence 
must be uclear, convincing and conclusive." 
Recently this Court again discussed presumptions in 
Meacham v. Allen, 262 P. (2d) 285. In that case this 
court affirmed a judgment against the contention of ap-
pellants that it was error for the trial court to instruct the 
jury that it might consider in arriving at its verdict the 
presumption that decedent was in the exercise of due care 
at the time of the fatal collision. In the course of its dis-
·Cussion on the subject of presumptions the court observed 
that some presumptions disappear when evidence was in-
troduced, but it went on from there to say: 
u* * ~· but there are other so-called presump-
tions, which require more than a prima facie case 
to make them ineffective. Some place the burden 
of proof, or persuasion on the party claiming the 
nonexistence of the presumed facts, others require 
clear and convincing evidence to overcome such 
presumption and still others require proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt before the trier of the facts may 
find that the presumed facts do not exist. In such 
cases the court in the first instance would have to 
determine that there is sufficient evidnece to sup-
port the finding, and leave it to the jury to decide 
whether the evidence has the required persuasive 
force." 
There are three decisions of this court which leave 
it clear beyond any doubt that the burden lay upon the 
defendants to clearly prove the absence of undue influence. 
They are Peterson v. Budge, 35 Utah 596, 102 Pac. 211, 
Omega lnvest~ent Co. v. Woolley, 72 Utah 474, 271 Pac. 
797, and Jardene v. Archibald, decided Jan. 24, 1955 and 
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reported in the February 24th advance sheet of Pacific 
Reporter at page 454. 
In the first of them it appears that Budge was a doctor 
and accepted a deed to real estate from Peterson who was 
his patient. Peterson sued to set aside the deed upon the 
ground that Budge took advantage of a confidential re-
lationship and got the deed through undue influence. 
Budge denied the confidential relationship and the undue 
influence. The trial court found for Budge and dismissed 
the case. This court reversed and ordered findings in be-
half of Peterson. The courts opinion fully supports our 
contentions in the case now under review. We take the 
liberty of here setting down an extended excerpt from the 
optnton: 
ccThere is no rule of law more firmly estab-
lished than that which holds that transactions be-
tween persons occupying fiduciary or confidential 
relations with each other, in which the stronger or 
superior party obtains an advantage over the other, 
cannot be upheld. In the case of Viallet v. Con. 
Ry. & P. Co., 30 Utah 260, 84 Pac. 496, 5 L.R.A. 
(N .S.) 613, a question involving this same principle 
was before this court, and in the course of the 
opinion it said: 
u ·cThe law is well settled that from the time 
the relation of physician and patient is created, un-
til it ceases to exist, the physician is not only legally 
bound to act in the utmost good faith in his treat-
ment of his patient professionally, but he is inhibit-
ed from taking advantage of the confidence grow-
ing out of this relation, reposed in him by his 
patient, and, by misrepresentation, or other unfair 
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means, or by the exercise of undue influence, induce 
his patient to convey, transfer, or otherwise dispose 
of, to such physician, or to other parties whom the 
physician may represent in other capicities valuable 
property rights for a wholly inadequate consider-
ation.' 
uAnd the rule is well settled that in actions 
of this kind, where these confidential relations are 
shown to exist, the purden of proof is cast upon the 
superior party to esta.blish the perfect fairness, ade-
quacy of consideration, and equity of the trans-
action. In Smith, Law of Fraud, section 190, the 
author says: 
u (While equity does not deny the possibility 
of valid transactions between the two parties, yet, 
because every fiduciary relation implies a condition 
of superiority held by one of the parties over the 
other, in every transaction between them by which 
the superior party obtains a possible benefit, equity 
raises a presumption against its validity, and casts 
upon that party the burden of proving affirmative-
ly its compliance with equitable requisites, and 
thereby overcoming the presumption.' 
rrlt having been shown that the confidential 
relation of physician and patient existed between 
the Budges and Peterson at the time the sale took 
place, the burden of proof shifted, and it beca.me 
necessary for the Budges, in order to uphold the 
sale, to show that it was for an adequate cons~dera­
tion, and that the entire transaction on their part 
was in every pa.rticular fair, just, and equitable." 
(Italics supplied) 
Omega Investment v. Woolley, supra, is even strong-
er. In that case it appears that Woolley procured an im-
portant stock interest in plaintiff corporation from Bald-
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win, who owned control. Woolley was neither a lawyer 
nor a doctor, but he gained Baldwin's full confidence and 
the court held that Woolley stood in a confidential rela-
tionship to Baldwin. In affirming a judgment setting 
aside the transfer and restoring the stock the Supreme 
Court made some statements which vastly illuminate the 
case under discussion: 
((There can be no question but that the trial 
court was justified in drawing the conclusion that 
a fiduciary relation existed between Baldwin and 
Woolley at the time the stock in question in this 
case was transferred. In fact, no other conclusion 
can reasonably be drawn. Woolley came into the 
employ of Baldwin as an agent to settle important 
litigation that was not finally and completely set-
tled until the day the negotiations for the transfer 
of the stock began. From the time of ·Baldwin's 
acquaintance with him in January of 1924, he 
constantly manifested an interest in Baldwin's wel-
fare, permitting his office to become the center of 
discussions with reference to the Baldwin interests. 
He proffered and endeavored to secure moneys to 
overcome the financial necessities, advised and con-
ferred with him, and in every action so conducted 
himself as to induce Baldwin to believe that Woolley 
was constantly working for Baldwin's welfare. 
cc cA confidential relation exists when confi-
dence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted 
by the other, when a confidence has been imposed 
and betrayed, or when influence has been acquired 
and abused. It embraces both technical and fidu-
ciary relations and those informal relations where 
one man trusts in and relies on another.' Dale v. 
Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175. 
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uThe confidential relation being shown to 
exist, the burden devolved upon Woolley to show 
that, in the making of the transaction, the fullest 
and fairest explanation and communication was 
made to Baldwin of every particular in Woolley's 
breast; that the transaction itself was fair, and the 
consideration paid therefor adequate, before a court 
is justified in permitting the transaction to stand. 
c:c:While equity does not deny the possibility of 
valid transactions between the two parties, yet be-
cause every fiduciary relation implies a condition 
of superiority held by one of the parties over the 
other, in every transaction between them by which 
the superior party obtains a possible benefit, equity 
raises a presumption against its validity, and casts 
upon that party the burden of proving affirmative-
ly its compliance with equitable requisites, and of 
thereby overcoming the presumption. ~· ~· * 
u c:Wherever two persons stand in such a rela-
tion that, while it continues, confidence is neces-
sarily reposed by one, and the influence which nat-
urally grows out of that confidence is possessed by 
the other, and this confidence is abused, or the in-
fluence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the 
expense of the confiding party, the person so avail-
ing himself of his position will not be permitted 
to retain the advantage, although the transaction 
could not have been impeached if no such confi-
dential relation had existed. Courts of equity have 
carefully refrained from defining the particular 
instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner 
that other and perhaps new cases might be exclud-
ed. It is settled by an overwhelming weight of 
authority that the principle extends to every pos-
sible case in which a fiduciary relation exists as a 
fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one 
side, and the resulting superiority and influence on 
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the other. The relation and the duties involved 
in it need not be legal; it may be moral, social, do-
mestic, or merely personal.' 2 Pomeroy, Equity 
Jurisprudence, Sec. 956. xxx 
ttThe rule as applied between attorney and 
client is well stated by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 156 Cal. 510, 105 
P. 981, as follows: 
cc c:The presumption always arises against the 
validity of a purchase or sale between the client and 
attorney made during the existence of the relation. 
The attorney must remove that presumption by 
showing affirmatively the most perfect good faith, 
the absence of undue influence, a fair price, know-
ledge, intention, and freedom of action by the 
client, and also that he gave his client full informa-
tion and disinterested advice.' 
ttNot only was the burden placed upon Wool-
ley to show a full and fair disclosure of all facts 
within his knowledge, but it was also his duty to 
show that the transaction was fair and equitable, 
and that the consideration paid was adequate. 
u~. ~· The rule of law in such cases is well 
stated in Hogan v. Leeper, 37 Okl. 655, 133 P. 190, 
47 L.R.A. (N .S.) 475 as follows: 
u c:Whenever there exists between parties con-
:fidence on the one hand and influence on the other, 
from whatever cause they may spring, equity re-
quires in all dealings between them the highest de-
gree of good faith on the part of him on whom the 
confidence is reposed. If a conveyance is executed 
by the other in his favor, the burden rests upon him 
to prove that it was not procured by means of such 
confidence and influence. It is his duty, before ac-
cepting the conveyance, to see that the grantor has 
disinterested advice and full information.' " 
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This court seemed to give full approval to the Okla-
homa rule that, ult is his duty, before accepting the con-
veyance, to see to it that the grantor had disinterested ad-
vice and full information." It is noted, however, that ·in 
Jardine v. Archibald, supra, this court stated that by its 
decision in Omega v. Woolley it did not intend to make 
independent advice an inflexible necessity. In that con-
nection this court said: 
uof course, among the elements which might 
be of great importance in most cases in determining 
alleged undue influence where a confidential rela-
tionship exists, is whether independent advice had 
been received by the donor, and in some instances 
without such proof the donor might not be able 
to sustain his burden of showing good faith." 
This court closed its opinion in Omega v. Woolley by 
quoting with approval language from the Supreme Court 
of Washington which could scarcely be more fitting nor 
more appropriate for application in this case: 
uThe following language of the Supreme 
Court of Washington in Stone v. Moody, 41 Wash. 
680, 84 P. 617, 85 P. 346, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 799, is 
applicable to the facts in this case: 
u (Where it is to the court perfectly plain that 
one party has over-reached the other and has gained 
an unjust and undeserved advantage which it would 
be inequitable and unrighteous to permit him to 
enforce, we do not believe that a court of equity 
should hesitate to interfere, even though the victim-
ized parties owe their predicament largely to their 
, own stupidity and carelessness. It is well known 
that many good people and people of average or 
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greater intelligence are sometimes duped and mis-
led by the skill, cleverness, and artifices of those 
who are adept in the matter of deceiving their fel-
lowmen; and courts should not throw about schem-
ers of this kind a protection that will tend to encour-
age the practice of their arts. Such people should 
not find encouragement in the thought that, by 
keeping their machinations within the letter of the 
law, they may find sanction for their practices and 
reap the reward of their craftiness. To the victim 
it is of little import whether his property is taken 
from him by a bold and forcible robbery or by an 
ingenious and unsuspected deception. The injury 
to him is the same; and the evil effect of court de-
cisions which permit the wrongdoers to enjoy the 
fruits of his chicanery is of no small import when 
viewed' in the light to£ public policy."' 
Jardine v. Archibald, supra, contains this courts latest 
decision upon the matter here in issue, and, if we cor-
rectly read the opinion, it is fatal to the main contention of 
appellants. In that case some deeds made by grantor just 
before her death were under attack by heirs of the grantor. 
The trial court found that there was a confidential re-
ationship between grantor and grantees, but further found 
that there was clear and convincing evidence of the ab-
sence of undue influence. This court ruled that the record 
contained evidence to justify the trial court's findings and 
affirmed the judgment. In the course of its opinion this 
court said: 
ttlt is well settled that where a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship exists between the donor 
and donee, equity raises a presumption against the 
validity of such transactions and the burden is cast 
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upon the donee to prove their validity and that 
there was no fraud or undue influence by proving 
affirmatively and by clear and convincing evidence 
compliance with equitable requisites. This is so 
because there is implied in every fiduciary or con-
fidential relationship a SU;periority held by one of 
the parties over the other." 
Having accepted the trial court's findings that there 
was a confidenital relationship but still no fraud or undue 
influence, this court then said: 
uThe court having found that there was no 
fraud or undue influence, the question we have to 
determine is: was there clear and convincing evi-
dence from which the court could so conclude." 
The foregoing means that in the case now under re-
view the burden was cast upon Macfarlane and Kostopulos 
to prove the absence of fraud and undue influence by 
uclear and convincing evidence." They wholly failed to 
discharge that burden and now seek to escape by asserting 
that they were under no such burden. 
The cases just referred to are applicable equally to 
Macfarlane and Kostopulos. While Kostopulos was neith-
er lawyer, doctor, nor priest, he so attached himself to 
Gail during the last two and a half years of her life that 
the trial court, pursuant to the cases above cited, was fully 
justified in finding that the relationship between Kostopul-
os and Gail was confidential. 
The court's attention is called to the fact that Peter-
son v. Budge, supra, is cited with approval by the Supreme 
Court of Utah in Glover v. Glover, 242 P. (2d) 298, 300, 
decided in 1952. 
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The case of contestant and respondent could rest se-
curely upon the decisions of this court in Peterson v. 
Budge, supra, Omega v. Woolley, supra, and Jardine v. 
Archibald, supra, but we feel justified in showing that the 
rule for which we contend is supported by the decisions 
of the courts of last resort throughout the land. 
The basic facts showing the relationships between 
Macfarlane and Kostopulas on the one side and Gail on 
the other persist from the beginning of the trial until the 
end, and because they do persist the legal result of such 
facts requires a finding of undue influence unless there is. 
clear and convincing proof to the contrary. Such is the 
holding of the many cases which are cited below. 
In the case of Coghill v. Kennedy, 24 So. 459, the 
Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that a presumption of 
undue influence arises where the beneficiary enjoys a con-
fidential relationship with the testator and actively par-
ticipates in the preparation of the will. In such case the 
burden is cast upon such beneficiary to make proof that 
there was no fraud or undue influence. 
Pertinent cases from California are indeed numerous. 
The controlling California law comes not from the Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal but from the Supreme Court of 
California. The rule as announced by that court is par-
ticularly strong in support of the contention here made by 
respondent. 
In Re Witt's Estate, 245 Pac. 197, deserves special at-
tention. From the decision in that case it appears that 
Lantz was a lawyer and the attorney for Mrs. Witt, the 
decedent. He was attentive to Mrs. Witt in her lifetime 
and prepared her will making himself the chief beneficiary. 
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The will was successfully con tested in the lower court and 
in affirming the Supreme Court of California said: 
uThe burden of proof to establish all of the 
elements of fraud or undue influence was not, in 
the instant case, upon the contestant, as is the usual 
situation upon the contest of a will. The burden 
was upon the defendant, by reason of his relation-
ship of attorney to Mrs. Witt, to overcome the pre-
sumption of fraud and unfair dealing which is 
automatically raised by the law as a protection to 
a client against the strong influence to which the 
confidential relation naturally gives rise. All deal-
ings between an attorney and his client for the 
benefit of the former are not only closely scrutin-
ized, but are presumptively invalid, on the ground 
of constructive fraud, and such presumption can 
be overcome only by the clearest and most satis-
factory evidence. Not only must the attorney of-
fer clear and satisfactory evidence that the trans-
action between himself and his client was fair and 
equitable, and no advantage was taken by him, but 
he must also offer proof that the client was fully 
informed of all matters relative to the transaction, 
and was so placed as to be able to act understand-
ingly and to deal with the attorney at arm's length. 
Kisling v. Shaw, 33 Cal. 425, 91 Am. Dec. 644; 
Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 1 0 5 P. 9 81, 15 6 Cal. 51 0 ; 
Clark v. Millsap (Cal. Sup.) 242 P. 918. ~:- ::· 
uBearing in mind that the burden was upon 
the defendant to remove any doubt of the unfair-
ness in his dealings with the decedent whereby she 
may have been induced to will hi1n her property, 
and to establish by clear and satisfactory proof that 
he had acted in the utmost good faith and taken no 
unfair advantage, it may be safely said we think 
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that the jury, having in mind the testimony ad-
duced as to the mental and physical condition of 
the decedent, was warranted in arriving at the con-
clusion that the defendant had not sustained the 
burden of proof upon him, and, therefore, found 
that the will was procured by the undue influence 
of the sole beneficiary." 
In Re Witt's Estate, supra, has become a leading case 
in California, and has been cited with approval and fol-
lowed in the following cases: 
Roberts v. Wachter, 231 F. (2d) 535, 538; 
In Re Doty's Estate, 201 P. (2d) 823; 
In Re Phillipi's Estate, 172 P. (2d) 377; 
McDonald v. Hewlett, 228 P. (2d) 83. 
In all of the cases following Witt it is clearly ruled 
that where the attorney draws the will, or participates in 
its preparation making himself a beneficiary, a presumption 
of undue influence arises which can be overcome only by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
In Re Hull's Estate, 146 P. (2d) 242, sets forth at 
page 245 the elements which must be shown to give rise 
to the rebuttable presumption of undue influence which 
in turn imposes the burden upon proponent of removing 
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 
In Re Graves Estate, 259 Pac. 935. This case is of 
particular importance in connection with Kostopulos. The 
proponent was not a lawyer but a real estate agent who in-
sinuated himself into the good graces of the testatrix and 
showed up as the principal beneficiary under a will, the 
preparation of which he procured. It will be noted that 
in that case the proponent had taken the pains of having 
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a doctor examine the testatrix at about the time the will 
was drawn. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in In Re Hotch-
kiss, 92 Atl. 419, ruled that proof of a confidential re-
lationship creates a presumption which shifts the bur-
den to the beneficiary to prove the absence of undue influ-
ence. To the same effect is the Connecticut court's opinion 
in In Re Kirby, 98 Atl. 349. 
The Delaware court considered the necessity of the 
beneficiary in a case like the one now under review being 
required to see to it that the other party to the confidential 
relationship had competent and genuinely independent ad-
vtce. 
In Peyton v. William Peyton, 123 A.L.R. 1482, the 
Delaware court said: 
u::. ::· ::· Confidential and fiduciary relations 
have the same meaning in law; and as every fidu-
ciary relation implies a condition of superiority of 
one of the parties over the other, equity raises a 
presumption against the validity of a transaction 
by which the superior obtains a possible benefit at 
the expense of the inferior, and casts upon him the 
burden of showing affirmatively his compliance 
with all equitable requisites. So, the principle is 
well established that a person standing in a confi-
dential relation towards another may not retain 
benefits conferred by his principal in a transaction 
as to which competent independent advice is con-
sidered necessary, except upon a satisfactory show-
ing that the principal had such advice in conferring 
the benefits. Wherever independent counsel would 
be of real assistance to the principal in deciding 
whether to enter into the transaction with his 
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:fiduciary, it is the latter's duty to advise his prin-
cipal to seek such counsel; and where in the cir-
cumstances of the case independent advice is 
deemed to be indispensable, it is not enough 
that the :fiduciary has urged his principal to 
obtain such advice; the transaction will be void-
able, at the election of the principal, if inde-
pendent advice was not, in fact, had. The equitable 
principle has its root in the fact that the parties are 
not regarded as being on an equal footing; and the 
court cannot be sure that the principal acted freely 
and in such way that he ought to be bound irre-
vocably, unless it be shown satisfactorily that he 
actually had the benefit of unbiased, competent 
counsel, and fully understood the matter of the 
proposed transaction. Application of the principle 
is not restricted to cases where, by evil design or 
contrivance to injure another, a benefit has been 
gained by a fiduciary at the expense of his princi-
pal; for even though a fiduciary has no purpose or 
intention to take an unfair advantage, equity will 
not lend its aid to the enforcement of the transac-
tion and the :fiduciary will not be permitted tore-
tain advantage acquired as a consequence of it, if 
the transaction result~ in inequality and injustice. 
The purpose of the rule is not so much to protect 
the cestui against the consequences of undue influ-
ence as it is to safeguard him against the results of 
his own voluntary acts induced by the confidential 
relation between him and his fiduciary the effect of 
which with respect to his own interests he may not 
fully comprehend. 13 R. C. L. 411, 13 67, 2 Pome-
roy, Equity, Sec. 956; Bispham, Equity (7th Ed.) 
Sec. 2 3 7; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 49 3 ; 
Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch. 252; Hall v. Otterson, 
52 N. J. Eq. 522, 28 A. 907, affirmed 53 N. J. Eq. 
695, 3 5 A. 1130; Slack v. Rees, 66 N. J. Eq. 447, 
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449, 59 A. 466, 69 L.R.A. 393; Pattberg v. Gott, 
102 N.J. Eq. 371, 140 A. 795; Graham v. Graham, 
143 N.Y. 573, 38 N.E. 722." 
In Walker v. Hunter, 17 Ga. 3 64, the Supreme Court 
of that state held that a confidential relationship between 
beneficiary and donor creates a presumption of undue in-
fluence which the proponent of the will must rebut. 
In Abbott v. Church, 123 N.E. 306, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois held that proof that testator's lawyer drew 
the will giving himself substantial property was sufficient 
to take the case to the jury. In the course of its opinion the 
court said: 
uAll the testimony offered and excluded by 
the court from the jury tended to prove that a 
fiduciary relation existed between testator and the 
devisee Frank L. Shepard, who received a substan-
tial benefit, and, in fact, the chief benefit, under 
the will, and it further tended to show that the will 
was prepared and drawn by Shepard. This proof 
established prima facie that the execution of the 
will was the result of undue influence exercised by 
that beneficiary, and, standing alone and undis-
puted, would entitle appellant to a verdict. Weston 
v. Teufel, 213 Ill. 291, 72 N.E. 908; Teter v. 
Spooner, 279 Ill. 39, 116 N.E. 673. Any relation 
existing between parties to a transaction, wherein 
one of the parties is in duty bound to act with the 
utmost good faith for the benefit of the other, is 
a confidential or fiduciary relation. Such a rela-
tion arises whenever a continuous trust is reposed 
by one person in the skill or integrity of another. 
12 Corpus Juris, 421; Thomas v. Whitney, 186 
Ill. 225, 57 N.E. 808. While it may be said that 
the evidence of appellees in this record tends some-
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what to rebut the presumption of undue influence, 
considering all the relevant testimony that should 
be in the record, still it was error in the court to 
exclude all the evidence and to direct a verdict. It 
was appellant's right to have the case submitted to 
a jury. The vital question in this case was whether 
or not all the legitimate and proper evidence of-
fered made a prima facie case, because, if it did not, 
the simple error in excluding the evidence in the 
transcript of the evidence before the probate court 
would not necessarily be fatal error. It was revers-
ible error to exclude all the evidence and to direct 
a verdict." 
In Re Eldred Estate, 207 N. W. 870 (Mich.), the Su-
preme Court of Michigan ruled that when the confidential 
relationship exists between testator and beneficiary a pre-
sumption of undue influence arises, and the burden is on 
the beneficiary to rebut it. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri in Pilitzer v. Chap-
man, 85 S.W. (2d) 400, ruled that where a beneficiary, 
in confidential relationship with the testator was ((ac-
tive in some way which caused or assisted in causing the 
execution of the will" there is a presumption of undue in-
fluence which does not disappear but raises an issue for the 
trier of the facts. 
The matter is put colorfully and quaintly by the 
Supreme Court of Missouri in Gott v. Dennis, 246 S. W. 
218, 223: 
uEver since Sarah unduly influenced Abraham 
(who also thated to do it') to send Hagar and Ish-
mael into the wilderness with but a bottle of water 
and a loaf of bread, in order that Sarah's son, Isaac, 
might inherit all of Abraham's property and Ish-
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mael should not receive his share, human nature has 
remained the same, and undue influence has been 
exercised by many other members of the family, as 
good as Sarah, upon fathers as strong-minded as 
Abraham, to cause them to make Ishmaelites of 
their children and deprive them of their inherit-
ance. But such conduct has never been sanctioned 
by the law of Moses or Missouri. We hold, there-
fore, that the circumstantial evidence in this case 
tends to show that the testator's (family' exercised 
such undue influence over him at the very outset 
of his married life as to separate him from his wife 
and child against his will, in ord~r to deprive them 
of their lawful rights in his property. Undue in-
influence, being once shown to exist, is presumed to 
continue." 
In In Re Bartle's Will, 13 Atl. (2d) 642, 19 Atl. (2d) 
17, the New Jersey court affirmed a judgment sustaining 
a will, but in the course of its opinion made this statement 
at page 643 of 13 Atl. (2d): 
((The difficulty in the case arises principally 
out of the fact that Mr. Herr was named in the 
paper as executor; he was legatee in the amount of 
$5,000.00; and he was further named as a conting-
ent sharer in the residuary estate in case the original 
bequest of the residue for charitable purposes should 
fail to become operative under certain somewhat 
complicated restrictions imposed by the will. The 
judge of the Orphan's Court said in his opinion, 
and we think correctly, that (under the statement 
of facts, it is clear that a presumption of undue in-
fluence has been raised, and that the burden of over-
coming the presumption and proving that the will 
was a spontaneous act of the testator was thrown 
upon Mr. Herr, Testator's attorney and confident-
ial adviser.' " 
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An especially strong statement is to be found in the 
New Jersey court's decision in Heims Estate, 40 Atl. (2d) 
657, where the New Jersey court said in part: 
u~. :~ * And beyond that, where the person to 
whom the burden has shifted is an attorney at law 
and the will is drawn by him in his capacity as at-
torney and legal adviser to the testator and in his 
own favor, we think that the testimony required to 
countervail the presumption should be impeccable 
and convincing.'' 
In Hunter v. Battiest, 192 Pac. 575, the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma dealt with an attorney who had drawn 
his client's will and become one of the principal bene-
ficiaries. We quote from that opinion: 
u* ~· * At any rate the burden would be on 
the attorney to prove that it was not undue in-
fluence, and this burden would not be discharged 
by a mere denial. Here the only witness to the al-
leged will is a convict, shown to be under obliga-
tion to the proponent and attorneys associated with 
him, and he cannot therefor be said to be a strictly 
disinterested witness. Nor is it necessary that the 
undue influence be exerted at the time of or im-
mediately prior to the execution of the will. If the 
undue influence has once been exerted it will be 
presumed to follow and taint every transaction 
between the parties thereafter and such presump-
tion of undue influence should be rebutted by dis-
interested witnesses. 
ccln transactions inter vivos, where one stands 
in the confidential relation of attorney to another, 
if the attorney receives benefits during the exist-
ence of such relation, a presumption of law arises 
that the benefits were the result of undue influ-
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ence; and in testamentary dispositions of property 
the rule as to the legal presumption of undue in-
fluence is the same as in dispositions inter vivos, 
except that the attorney standing in confidential 
relation to the testator and receiving benefits under 
the will must be shown to have in some way actively 
participated in the preparation of the will or the 
disposition of the property. 
((When the legal presumption of undue in-
fluence has arisen by showing confidential relations, 
whether in dispositions of property inter vivos or 
by will, the burden of proof is upon the party seek-
ing to make the benefit of such disposition to rebut 
the presumption attached thereto by showing eith-
er a severance of the confidential relations, or that 
the party making the disposition had competent 
and independent advice in regard thereto. Gidney 
v. Chappell, supra; McQueen v. Wilson, 131 Ala. 
606, 31 South. 94. ~~ ~· ~· 
((The law also presumes that an attorney will 
so act and will so conduct himself as to leave not 
even a shadow of suspicion that he has done any-
thing to place his personal interests in conflict with 
those of his client. If he has done so and has there-
by secured an advantage over his client or a gift 
or devise from his client, the burden is doubly great 
of showing that such advantage or such gift or de-
vice was not obtained through undue influence. 
uit might be said that in determining that un-
due influence was exercised in this case that the 
court was guided by reasons of public policy and 
by considerations which relate to the protection of 
the client, to the due and orderly administration of 
justice, to the honor and purity of the profession, 
and to the dignity of the court itself. A will be-
queathing all the property of a client to his attorney 
in a capital case after the conviction of the client 
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and his sentence to death, made while the appeal is 
pending, and received by the attorney with full 
knowledge of all the conditions, should be regarded 
with the greatest suspicion. It is absolutely incon-
sistent with the duty, burdens, and obligations 
which an attorney assumes when he enters into the 
relation of attorney and client, and in fact is sub-
versive of them. To presume that such a will was 
made without undue influence, and is therefore 
valid and effectual, would be fraught with the most 
pernicious consequences both to the public and to 
the profession. It would give rise to most unscrup-
ulous and unprofessional practice, and the rankest 
fraud could be perpetuated on unsuspicious and un-
fortunate clients." 
One of the most interesting and illuminating cases 
which has come to our attention is In Re Lobb's Will. 
That case was twice before the Supreme Court of Oregon 
and is reported at 14 P. (2d) 808 and 160 P. (2d) 295. 
The trial court twice sustained the will and the Supreme 
Court of Oregon twice reversed it. 
From the Oregon decision it appears that Mrs. Lobb 
was an elderly woman who had some property in Oregon 
and some in California. Wilson was her lawyer. Mrs. Lobb 
asked Wilson to write a will for her making himself 
residuary legatee. Wilson's testimony was that she in-
sisted upon the preparation of such a will but that he, 
for a time at least, resisted the suggestion. He went so 
far as to tell Mrs. Lobb that he would not write a will 
making himself beneficiary, and suggesting that she have 
it drawn by an outside lawyer. She then mentioned the 
name of a lawyer by the name of Clark. Clark was not 
Wilson's partner, but shared office space with him. There-
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after Wilson suggested that Clark call upon Mrs. Lobb 
and write her will. Clark took the office secretary, who 
assisted him and Wilson, to Mrs. Lobb's home, and a will 
was prepared in which Wilson was named as residuary 
legatee. Thereafter Mrs. Lobb called at the office and 
stated that she wanted a codicil prepared eliminating one 
of the special bequests. Neither Clark nor Wilson was 
present, but Mrs. Lobb insisted upon having the codicil 
prepared, so it was written up by the secretary and exe-
cuted by Mrs. Lobb. The effect of the codicil was to 
increase the residuary estate. Under the circumstances 
the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled that the advice pro-
cured by Mrs. Lobb from Clark was not independent 
advice, and that case was just as if Wilson himself had 
drawn the will. The Supreme Court of Oregon rendered 
its decision annulling and setting aside the will and codicil. 
In the course of its opinion the court said: -
((Mr. Justice Harris, in Kirchoff v. Bernstein, 
92 Or. 378, 181 P. 746, said: (The rules which de-
fine the duties of an attorney when dealing with 
his client are well established. The relation between 
an attorney and client has always been treated as 
one of special trust and confiden.ce, and for that 
reason the law requires that the conduct of an 
attorney, when dealing with his client, shall be 
characterized by fairness, honesty, and good faith. 
Indeed, so strict is the in junction not to take ad-
vantage of the client that, when a client challenges 
the fairness of a contract made with his attorney, 
the latter has the burden of showing, not only that 
he used no undue influence, but also that he gave 
to his client all the information and advice which 
it would have been his duty to give, if he himself 
had not been interested, and that the transaction 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
52 
was as beneficial to the client as it would have been 
if the latter had dealt with a stranger. * :~ *' 
uThe following comments upon the foregoing 
from a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Bennett, 
are peculiarly applicable to the present case: 
u (These are brave, strong words, and with 
every syllable of them I entirely concur. They fix 
the duty of an attorney toward his client at a high 
standard, but not too high, when we consider the 
peculiarly confidential relation which an attorney 
enjoys, and the fact that those with whom he deals 
are oftentimes helpless from infancy or old age, and 
are generally ignorant of the law, and of their legal 
rights; and practically at the mercy of the lawyer 
who represents them. Such a declaration of the 
principles which govern attorneys will be an in-
spiration to the lawyer who cares deeply for his 
profession and for its honor. 
u (When it becomes generally known that this 
is the standard which governs the conduct of at-
torneys, and that the courts unflinchingly carry 
the principles so declared into execution, there will 
be an end of that unjust belief, unfortunately now 
so general among laymen, that lawyers are mercen-
ary and unscrupulous grafters, and that the courts, 
being composed of lawyers promoted, look with 
complacent tolerance and winking eye upon the un-
just greed and rapacity of their erstwhile associ-
ates.' " 
To the same effect is In Re Brown's Estate, 108 P. 
(2d) 775, by which decision the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon set aside a will which was written by an attorney 
and which made him an important beneficiary. 
In In Re Everett, 68 S.E. 924, the Supreme Court of 
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North Carolina held that when a will is executed by or 
through the intervention of a person occupying a con-
fidential relation toward the testator whereby such person 
is made the executor and a large beneficiary under the 
will, such circumstances create a strong suspicion that 
undue or fraudulent influence has been exerted, nand 
then the law casts on him the burden of showing that the 
will was the free and voluntary act of testator." 
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Hartman v. 
Strickler, 82 Va. 225, said: 
uwhere a will executed by an old man differs 
from his previously expressed intentions, and is 
made in favor of those who stand in relations of 
confidence or dependence towards him, it raises 
a violent presumption of fraud and undue influ-
ence, which should be overcome by satisfactory 
testimony.'' 
This court, in Omega v. Woolley, supra, quoted 
with approval from the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Washington in Stone v. Moody, 84 Pac. 617. 
To the same effect as the foregoing cases are: Ban-
croft v. Otis, 8 So. 286 (Ala.); McElhaney v. Jones, 72 
So. 531, (Ala.); In Re Cooper, 71 Atl. 676; Roberts v. 
Wachter, 213 F. (2d) 535; In Re Doty's Estate, 201 P. 
(2d) 823 (Cal.); In Re Phillipi's Estate, 172 P. (2d) 377 
(Cal.); McDonald v. Hewlett, 228 P. (2d) 83 (Cal.); 
In Re Johnson's Estate, 87 P. (2d) 900 (Cal.); In Re 
Gallo's Estate, 214 P. (2d) 496; In Re Hotchkiss, 92 Atl. 
419 (Conn.); Davis v. Frederick, 118 S.E. 206 (Ga.); 
O'Day v. Crabb, 109 N.E. 724 (Ill.); Abbott v. Cburch, 
123 N.E. 306 (Ill.); Tidholm v. Tidholm, 62 N.E. (Zd) 
473 (Ill.); Bridwell v. Swank, 84 Mo. 455; In Re Swartz, 
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16 Atl. (2d) 374 (Pa.); In Re Raasch's Will, 284 N. W. 
571 (Wis.); Page on Wills, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 270, 
p. 123 3. 
In might be contended that the rule of the New 
York court in In Re Smith, 95 N.Y. 516, is against re-
spondent, but a reading of the case will show otherwise. 
We quote from that decision: 
ctThe mere fact, therefore, that the proponent 
was the attorney of the testatrix, did not ~· !Z. * 
create a presumption against the validity of the 
legacy given by her will. But taking all the cir-
cumstances together, the :fiduciary relation, the 
change of testamentary intention, the age and 
mental and physical condition of the decedent, the 
fa.ct that the proponent was the draftsman and 
principal beneficiary under the will and took an 
active part in procuring its execution, and that 
the testatrix acted without independent advice,-
a case was made which required explanation, and 
which imposed upon the proponent the burden 
of satisfying the court that the will was the free, 
untrammeled, and intelligent expression of the 
wishes and intention of the testatrix." 
Graham v. Courtright, 161 N.W. 774, is a decision 
from the Supreme Court of Iowa which seems to hold 
that a presumption of undue influence is not based on the 
mere existence of a :fiduciary relationship. It is contrary 
to all other cases we have found upon the subject. 
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APPELLANTS' POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Because appellants and respondent are of such di-
vergent views as to what rules of law apply to the facts 
of the case, we are persuaded that a categorical reply to 
appellants' brief would not be useful to the court. The 
arguments made and cases cited by appellants will be 
given attention in a general way. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Appellants' argument begins upon page 51 of their 
brief. Their springboard is the statement that the burden 
of proving both lack of testamentary capacity and undue 
influence was upon contestant and respondent. They end 
their argument upon page 12 6 of their brief, with the 
statement printed in italics that there isn't a whisper in 
the record that Gail was ever induced to do anything 
against her will. That statement entirely ignores the basic 
fact that Gail was a childish and simple-minded woman; 
that she was in confidential relationships with both appel-
lants, she reposing her confidence and they accepting it; 
that MacFarlane was Gail's attorney at law, her attorney 
in fact and confidential friend, and as such, prepared 
and supervised the execution of the will and codicils; 
that appellants would be unduly enriched by the will and 
the codicils and that Gail had no independent advice in 
connection with the signing of any of the testamentary 
documents. Appellants choose to overlook and ignore the 
rule of law that the basic facts of the case cast upon them 
the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence 
that the will and codicils were free of fraud and undue 
influence. 
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The rule so recently stated by this court in Jardine v. 
Archibald has been the settled rule of this court ever since 
its opinion in Viallet v. Con. R. & P. Co., 30 Utah 260, 
84 P. 495, decided in February, 1906. No decision of this 
court cited and relied upon by appellants involved facts 
like those presently under review. We must conclude that 
if the facts of this case had been before the court in the 
cases ·Cited by appellant this court would have applied 
the rule of the Budge, Woolley and Jardine cases and the 
results would have been different. 
All of appellants' conclusions reflect appellants' re-
fusal to appreciate or recognize the rule of law that im ... 
posed upon them the burden of freeing themselves from 
the charge of undue influence by clear and convincing 
evidence. Further discussion of that point would be pro-
fitless. 
GOODNESS OR EVIL 
On page 124 of their brief appellants conclude that, 
uGoodness or evil in the hearts of the beneficiaries has 
no materiality." Whether that conclusion is by way of 
confession and avoidance we express no opinion, but it 
overlooks the morals and the public policy out of which 
grew the rules of law governing the relationship of attor-
ney and client and other confidential relationships. If a 
lawyer has evil designs upon the property of his confiding 
and simple-minded client, he may be subject to no penalty 
just for his evil thought, but law and equity alike step in 
to stay the fruition of such designs. 
COLLUSION 
Appellants conclude that no collusion or joint effort 
on the part ~f MacFarlane and Kostoplos was shown to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57 
exist. The existence or not of such joint effort could in 
no way impair the validity of the trial court's judgment 
but proof of collusion is in the record. 
Kostopulos believed that the Swan family was 
wealthy. His close adhesion to the family began just be-
fore Gail's aged father fell upon his last illness and had 
ripened into a confidential relationship before the first 
codicial was signed. 
When MacFarlane took a general power of attorney 
from Gail he assumed a trust relationship as to her pro-
perty. It was his duty as such to protect the property 
for Gail's benefit as against himself and all others. And 
yet, when he came into possession of Gail's bonds and 
stocks they were divided equally between him and Kosta-
pulos. Likewise, when the savings accounts were adjusted 
by him at Union Trust Company the amounts standing 
in his name and that of Kostopulos were identical, and 
the small amounts withdrawn from those two accounts 
during Gail's life were identical. The values of the pro-
perties assigned to each in the last codicial is about $100,-
' 000.00. While the foregoing may not compel such a find-
ing, it is certainly ample to support the finding that there 
was an understanding between MacFarlane and Kostopulos 
for the division of Gail's property. Kostopulos' statement 
to the witness Butler that MacFarlane made a mistake 
when he omitted Os.car Beam from the codicil is likewise 
persuasive that the preparation of the codicil had been 
the subject of discussion and agreemen.t between the two. 
DESTRUCTION OF THE WILL 
It is urged by appellants that Gail never destroyed 
the will or either of the codicils in her lifetime and that 
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her failure to do so is proof that the documents expressed 
her will uninfluenced by either of appellants. Such fact, 
standing alone, may be evidence to be considered by the 
court, but it cannot be said to be ((clear and convincing 
proof." This is especially true when considered in con-
nection with the evidence upon the point. The confidential 
relationship between appellants and Gail was never in-
terrupted and the pressure of the influence arising from it 
was never relaxed. There is evidence in the record upon 
this very point which is without dispute and which the trial 
court could not ignore. MacFarlane drew the will and 
both codicils in his own office and there is no evidence that 
he ever entrusted possession of any of them to Gail. If 
he had ever surrendered possession of any of them to her 
he surely would have so testified. 
The only direct evidence upon the subject came from 
Mrs. Venita Frank, who was Gail's personal friend and 
wife of her attending physician. Mrs. Frank testified 
without contradiction that Gail, toward the end of her 
life, frequently stated that she could not get uher papers" 
from MacFarlane. (R. 561-2-3) Mrs. Frank asked Gail 
why she did not demand them and Gail's answer was that 
she had demanded them but Ma.cFarlane had replied with 
this statement: uGail, you are a sick girl. You can't 
have your papers around the house." 
The trier of the facts could properly conclude that 
Gail never had possession of the will or either codicil. He 
could also quite properly conclude that the same reluct-
ance which induced MacFarlane to prepare the will and 
codicils himself instead of sending Gail to an independent 
lawyer for that purpose, also induced him to retain ex-
clusive possession of the documents after they were signed. 
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APPELLANTS' CASES 
Appellants have cited two score cases in support of 
their contentions. None of them is authority against 
the position of respondent in the instant case. 
One group of cases cited by appellants involves pre-
sumptions. The basic facts which led the court below to 
its conclusions are entirely missing from the cases cited. 
Typical of the cases relied upon by appellants is Newell's 
Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. (2d) 230. In the Newell case 
there was no confidential relationship. The presumption 
discussed in the Newell case was one based upon the total 
absence of facts, while the one now under review flows 
from th.z basic facts in the record. 
Likewise, the record in Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 
25 P. (2d) 609, did not contain the basic facts which 
must control the decision in the case at bar. 
Two cases cited by appellants involved the presump-
tion of sanity in criminal cases. Such a presumption arises 
in the absence of facts, not as the result thereof. Those 
cases throw no light upon the present inquiry. 
Some of appellants' cases involve the presumption of 
due care or the lack of it. No case cited by appellants 
involved the confidential relationship and the rules rela-
tive thereto which were so clearly recognized by this court 
in Jardine v. Archibald, supra, and prior cases which we 
have discussed. 
Appellants have sought help from the courts of Cali-
fornia but they have gone not to the Supreme Court of 
California but to the intermediate courts of appeal. The 
California law applicable to a case like this one is stated 
in Witt's case, supra, and no case cited by appellants from 
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California could or pretends to impair the force of that 
case. 
For example, appellants cite Phillipi's Estate, 76 Cal. 
App. (2d) 100, 172 P. (2d) 377. That case contains 
this language: 
ccThat Mr. Wilson was the attorney of the 
testator and that a confidential relationship existed 
between them is not questioned. Where such a 
situation exists the rebuttable presumption of fraud 
or undue influence arises where the attorney profits 
from his dealings with his client. That presumption 
can only be overcome by clear and satisfactory 
evidence that the transaction between the attorney 
and his client was fair a.nd equitable and that the 
attorney had taken no advantage of the relation-
ship and that the client was fully informed as to 
all matters relative to the transaction. In re Estate 
of Witt, 198 Cal. 407, 245 P. 197." 
The rule so crisply stated in the foregoing quotation 
may be found restated or approved by implication in all 
the cases from California cited by appellants. The same 
is true with respect to cases cited from other jurisdictions. 
Many cases from this and other jurisdictions are cited 
in connection with the question of testamentary capacity. 
With the general rules announced and applied in those 
cases we are constrained to agree. None of those cases 
holds that the trier of the facts may not view a mental 
capacity against surrounding circumstances. Here the 
court, upon the whole record, concluded that he could 
not correctly evaluate Gail's admittedly sick mind except 
as it was further weakened and overcome by the pressure 
of undue influence exerted by those whom she fully 
trusted. 
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Much of appellants' brief is devoted to the burden 
of proof. Among the cases chiefly relied upon by them 
are Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256, and Bryan's 
Estate, supra. Neither of those cases is at all like the one 
now under review. While the facts in the Hanson and 
Bryan cases are not in point here, the decision in each of 
those cases nods approvingly toward the rule for which 
we contend and which has been so clearly stated by this 
court in the Budge and other decisions. 
case: 
Appellants quote the following from the Hanson 
u* ::· ::· As to undue influence, in the usual 
and less offensive sense, the burden of proving 
affirmatively that it operated upon the will in ques-
tion lies still on the party who alleges it, either 
by direct evidence or proof of circumstances in-
consistent with fair dealing." 
The italicized portion of the quotation has real sig-
nificance. In the case at bar proof was made of circum-
stances which are universally held to be so inconsistent 
with fair dealing as to require clear and convincing proof 
of the absence of undue influence. 
From Bryan's case appellants quote the following: 
u::. ::· ::· The opportunity to exercise influence, 
unless combined with circumtsances tending to 
show its exercise, affords no presumption that it 
was in fact exercised. * :-.- :E-" 
The italicized portion of the foregoing quotation 
reminds us that the facts of the instant case show cir-
cumstances which not only tend to show the exercise of 
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undue influence, but which compel a finding of undue 
influence in the absence of clear and convincing proof 
to the contrary. 
Appellants lean upon Buttars Estate, 261 P. (2d) 174, 
but it gives them no support. The lawyer referred to in 
that case was not a beneficiary. The case is distinguished 
from the one at bar by the following exerpt from the 
optnton: 
u c:::. * ::· This is especially so in view of the 
positive testimony of the subscribing witnesses 
that she appeared to know what she was doing 
at that time and that she was alone with the lawyer 
when she made her wishes known, since the Will 
itself shows she remembered who were rrthe natural 
objects of her bounty" and that she disposed of 
her property c:c:understandingly according to some 
plan formed in her mind." There being no ques-
tion of fraud or undue influence in the formulat-
ing and relation of that plan to the lawyer. * * *' " 
Such is the quality of the cases relied upon by ap-
pellants as to the burden of proof. Upon the facts of 
the case the rule announced in Witt's case, supra, is the 
true rule by universal affirmation: 
uThe burden of proof to establish all of the 
elements of fraud or undue influence was not, in 
the instant case, upon ·COntestant, as is the usual 
situation upon the contest of a will. The burden 
was upon defendant, by reason of his relationship 
of attorney to Mrs. Witt, to overcome the pre-
sumption of fraud and unfair dealing ::· * *" 
The Budge, Wolley and Jardine cases control the 
instant case. No case or text has been cited by appellants 
which impairs the force of those cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. A total invalid from early childhood until she 
was 27 years of age, Gail continued to be disease ridden 
and a social recluse. Of arrested mental and emotional 
development she was utterly guileless and highly suscept-
ible to the blandishments of outsiders. She gave her un-
reserved trust and confidenc.e to appellants, and against 
their domination what intellect she may have had was 
no protection to her. Her trust, her welfare, and her 
childish mind were given to the safekeeping of appellants. 
If in any circumstances she could be said to have had a 
testamentary .capacity, that capacity was surrendered to 
MacFarlane and Kostopulos, and they exercised it for her 
to their own enrichment. The trial court was justified in 
finding and adjudging that Gail was lacking in testamen-
tary capacity. 
2. The confidential relationship between Gail and 
MacFarlane is freely admitted by appellants, and no 
serious challenge is made to the findings of such a rela-
tionship as between Gail and Kostopulos. The obligations 
upon appellants by reason of their fiduciary relationships 
to the childish and afllicted Gail was enlarged three fold 
by the confidential hold they had upon her father and her 
-sister. When all of the facts of their relationship came 
out appellants fell under the burden of proving by clear 
and convincing evidence the absence of undue influence. 
They wholly failed to discharge the burden. Upon the 
record the trial court was fully justified in finding and 
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adjudging that the pretended will and codicils were the 
result of undue influence and therefore void and of no 
force or effect. 
Wherefore, respondent prays that the judgment of 
the trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
By Paul H. Ray 
Grant C. Aadnesen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
At the conclusion of the trial of this case, and oral 
arguments presented by counsel, the matter was taken 
under advisement by the Court. Since that time the 
Court received written briefs submitted by counsel; also 
the transcript of the testimony in the case. I have care-
fully read the briefs and transcript, and I have endeavored 
to analyze all of the testimony given at the trial. After a 
careful consideration of the record in this case, I conclude 
that the contest of Mrs. Theo Hendee should be and must 
be sustained, and that the Will of Wilda Gail Swan and 
both Codicils thereto should be and they are hereby de-
clared null and void. 
The complaint in this case alleges that the Will and 
Codicils be adjudicated null and void upon two grounds: 
1. That Wilda Gail Swan was incompetent to make a 
Will or Codicil. 
2. That the Will and Codicils were the result of fraud 
and undue influence exercised upon Miss Swan by the de-
fendants. 
In reaching the conclusion stated above, I deem it es-
sential to discuss briefly and separately the question of 
testamentary capacity and undue influence. To me the rec-
ord in this case clearly indicates that Wilda Gail Swan never 
matured either mentally or emotionally. The evidence 
established by lay witnesses is in accord with all of the evi-
dence given by the medical witnesses, to the effect that 
Miss Swan had the mentality of a child in the age range 
from eleven to thirteen years. Further, the record dis-
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11 APPENDIX 
closes beyond dispute that, by reason of health impairment, 
Wilda Gail Swan, until she reached the approximate age 
of twenty-seven years, lacked all of the contacts and ac-
tivities of a normal person, and was prevented a normal 
emotional development; that she was almost a total re-
cluse; that thereafter, by reason of medical treatment giv-
en her, during the last ten or twelve years of her life her 
seizures were restricted, her health somewhat improved, 
and to a limited degree she enjoyed self-reliance which en-
abled her to go to town in Salt Lake City to attend her 
personal needs and some of her business affairs. However, 
during all of that time her activities were under the super-
vision of either her father, various banking institutions, 
her sister Mrs. Hendee, her aunt Mrs. Martsolf, and by 
hired companions. 
It becomes necessary to discuss the case briefly as it 
relates resp~ctively to Grant Macfarlane, Dan Kostopulos 
and Ada Bridge. 
As far as the evidence pertaip.s to Grant Macfarlane, 
to me it discloses a shocking and reprehensible abuse of trust 
which was imposed in him by and through and as a result 
of the highly confidential relationship existing between 
Macfarlane and Miss Swan. Grant Macfarlane is a lawyer 
of long experience, and as such practiced before the Courts 
of this State and the Federal Courts. In this regard he is 
possessed of trained intelligence. Also he is a man of great 
personal charm and ingratiating personality. 
The record shows Macfarlane became Miss Swan's at-
torney in 1944, and until Miss Swan's death the relationship 
of attorney and client existed. It becomes inconceivable 
that Macfarlane could have been long unaware of Miss 
Swan's mental frailty and emotional susceptibility. It ap-
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pears further that matters were not allowed to rest upon 
the strict relationship of attorney and client between these 
two individuals. Macfarlane became the close and confi-
dential friend of Miss Swan. He became acquainted with 
Miss Swan's family, consisting of her father and her sister, 
who each exercised great concern over Wilda Gail Swan's 
welfare. Macfarlane also became attorney and confidential 
advisor to Gail Swan's father, and likewise he became the 
trusted friend of Mrs. Hendee, Gail Swan's sister. 
It therefore becomes apparent that Macfarlane, per-
sonlly and as a lawyer, had reposed in him full trust, faith 
and confidence, not only of Miss Swan, but her father and 
her sister as well. Thus, in such circumstances, it became 
and was his solemn duty to exercise the most meticulous 
care in seeing that he never took the slightest advantage of 
Wilda Gail Swain, and that he never abused the confidence 
she reposed in him to his own profit. 
When the purported Will was drawn on May 2, 1947, 
Wilda Gail Swan appeared at Macfarlane's law office en-
tirely alone. At that time she brought with her a prior 
Will, under the terms of which she bequeathed and devised 
her estate to her father and her sister. Macfarlane pre-
pared the purported Will, by the terms of which he hoped 
to inherit property located in Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
.record is manifestly clear that he did not at that time sug-
gest· or indicate that Gail Swan should have independent 
legal advice, or independent advice of any kind whatso-
ever. Moreover, he caused this purported Will to be signed 
by Wilda Gail Swan in the presence of attesting witnesses 
of his own selection, one being his private secretary. In 
the circumstances surrounding the signing of this purport-
ed Will, Macfarlane certainly was in a position of such 
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dominating influence that it was his clear unrevokable duty 
to see to it that Wilda Gail Swan had independent advice in 
connection with the preparation and signing of such an 
important document. The only advice she received was 
the advice given and furnished to her by Macfarlane. 
It is my judgment that Wilda Gail Swan was incom-
petent to make the Will. However, assuming that if she 
were technically competent, she at that time was so far 
under the 'influence and domination of Macfarlane that 
the document must be held to be the result of Macfarlane's 
fraud and influence, and therefore void. 
After this purported Will was signed, the relationship 
of Macfarlane and Wilda Gail Swan, and the highly con-
fidential nature attendant thereto, never deteriorated, di-
minished or relaxed. On the contrary, it became more 
cemented by frequent professional and social contacts be-
tween Macfarlane and Miss Swan, and became strength-
ened by the play upon Miss Swan's sympathy because of 
Macfarlane's eye trouble. He permitted her to worry and 
brood over his affliction and to believe he was in financial 
straits because of it. 
When the :first Codicil was signed, the same circum-
stances and conditions existed as when the purported Will 
was signed. Again it appears that no independent advice 
was ever suggested by Macfarlane to Wilda Gail Swan. 
Here we :find a woman who had never matured nor-
mally, physically or emotionally, pitted against the in-
gratiating and charming lawyer who had reposed in him 
Miss Swan's complete trust and confidence. The result ob-
tained under these circumstances and surroundings and 
lack of independent advice was the signing of a document 
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which, if given efficacy, would invest property in Grant 
Macfarlane worth more than $100,000.00. 
I therefore feel constrained and do conclude that the 
signing of this document was induced by fraud and the un-
due influence exercised by Macfarlane, and therefore is 
void. 
During the month of April, 1950, Macfarlane pre ... 
pared and caused Wilda Gail Swan to sign a full and gen-
eral power of attorney, making him her attorney in fact, 
under which instrument he had the power and authority 
to exercise a wide discretion in Miss Swan's matters and 
business affairs. Macfarlane did strengthen his already 
strong hold upon the mind and property of Wilda Gail 
Swan. 
On the witness stand Macfarlane denied that he had 
exercised the power of attorney, except in connection with 
certain deposits of money in the Union Trust Company 
and the execution of one lease. However, upon cross ex-
amination he admitted that, as attorney in fact for Miss 
Swan, he procured from the Walker Bank and Trust Com-
pany certain corporate shares of stock belonging to and 
standing in the name of Wilda Gail Swan. He also caused 
a certificate representing 8 0 shares of Westinghouse Elec-
tric stock to be transferred to his own name, and a cer-
tificate for 100 shares of Utah Power and Light Company 
to be transferred to the name of Dan Kostopulos. There-
after Macfarlane claims to have received as a gift from Miss 
Swan the Westinghouse stock and $1,500 par value of U.S. 
bonds. 
The record in this case shows that Macfarlane, for 
legal services rendreed Wilda Gail Swan, billed her for the 
same and was paid by her for all professional services ren-
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dered. The stock and bonds he took from Miss Swan were 
received entirely without consideration. At the time he 
took and received the stock and bonds, he also knew that 
Kostopulos was getting from Wilda Gail Swan the Utah 
Power and Light stock and $1,500.00 in U. S. bonds. It 
appears that between Macfarlane and Kostopulos they re-
ceived practically all of the income-producing securities 
which Wilda Gail Swan possessed. 
From the evidence respecting the stock and bonds, it 
becomes abundantly clear to my mind that Macfarlane in-
tended at all times to turn, and did turn, the confidential 
relationship reposed in him by Miss Swan to his own profit, 
and in complete disregard of all the obligations imposed 
upon him by the confidential relationship existing be-
tween himself and Miss Swan. 
Further attention is also directed to the fact that, in 
the exercise of such a power of attorney, Macfarlane caused 
money, deposited in the name of Wilda Gail Swan in the 
Union Trust Company at Salt Lake City, to be divided in 
several accounts. One account remained in the name of 
Wilda Gail Swan, one in the name of Wilda Gail Swan and 
Mrs. Hendee or Mr. Hendee, one in the name of Wilda 
Gail Swan and Dan Kostopulos, and one in the name of 
Wilda Gail Swan and Grant Macfarlane. The record 
shows that each of such accounts were in the approximate 
amount of $5,000.00. The record further shows that dur-
ing Wilda Gail Swan's life the account in her name and 
the one in the name of her sister and brother-in-law were 
practically depleted. The record further shows that the 
amounts upon deposit in the name of Grant Macfarlane and 
Dan Kostopulos were subject to only insignificant with-
drawals, and at the time of Wilda Gail Swan's death Kosto-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX Vll 
pulos' and Macfarlane's accounts were in the amount of 
$4,597.17 each. 
This clearly discloses that during the time Macfarlane 
acted as Miss Swan's attorney at law, her attorney in fact 
and her confidential friend and business advisor, he accept-
ed from her, in addition to compensation for all services 
rendered, stock valued at $3,000.00, bonds of the value of 
$1,500.00, and savings deposited in the amount of nearly 
$5,000.00, totalling $9,500.00. At this same time he stood 
by and permitted the depletion of Miss Swan's estate by 
an equivalent amount which Dan Kostopulos obtained. 
Substantially $19,000.00 was thus extracted from Wilda 
Gail Swan's estate by Macfarlane and Kostopulos. 
By the time the last Codicil was prepared and signed 
on April 23, 1951, Kostopulos had assiduously and success-
fully wormed his way into the full trust and confidence 
of Miss Swan, and it would appear that Kostopulos was in 
competition with Macfarlane in the acquisition of Wilda 
Gail Swan's property, and that Mcfarlane had to reckon 
with Kostopulos in the disposition of Wilda Gail Swan's 
property. It would appear to this Court, under the cir-
cumstances which Macfarlane and Kostopulos acquired the 
stocks and bonds from Miss Swan, should have persuaded 
Macfarlane that Miss Swan needed a guardian much more 
than she needed an attorney in fact. Therefore, I find 
that by the time the second Codicil was prepared and about 
to be signed, both Macfarlane and Kostopulos had become 
doubtful of Wilda Gail Swan's testamentary capacity. 
Grant Macfarlane testified in effect that it was Wilda 
Gail Swan who was doubtful of her own capacity. In any 
event there existed substantial doubt as to her capacity, 
and Macfarlane and Kostopulos deemed it expedient and 
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wise, in furtherance of their own interests, to have the 
testamentary document attested by medical men. 
The apprehension of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, rela-
tive to Miss Swan's mental capacity, appears to be in 
harmony with the feelings of Mortenson and Fitzpatrick, 
who were called as witnesses by the defendants. Morten-
son and Fitzpatrick both testified that Miss Swan had re-
acted to their friendly intentions by offering them bequests 
of property. This proposal of Miss Swan's was rejected 
by both of them and each stated that they would have been 
embarrassed to accept gifts from her. 
Feeling as he did, Macfarlane drew the last Codicil, 
then made an appointment with Dr. Nielsen. It is sig-
nificant that Macfarlane did not call either Dr. Pace or 
Dr. Frank. Both of these doctors were familiar with Wil-
da Gail Swan's condition. After Dr. Neilsen had been se-
lected, arrangements were then made for Kostopulos to 
fetch Wilda Gain Swan to Dr. Neilsen's office, where Mac-
farlane waited for them. Dr. Neilsen made a physical ex-
amination, and in that brief time he discovered that Miss 
Swan was a case for a psychiatrist. Dr. Neilsen then called 
Dr. Drake, a psychiatrist. 
During the examination and questioning of Miss Swan 
by the doctors, Macfarlane and Kostopulos were either 
present or in adjoining rooms, and Miss Swan was never 
free from the effect of their influen.ce and domination. Dr. 
Neilsen and Dr. Darke both became attesting witnesses to 
the last Codicil, and each testified that in his judgment 
Wilda Gail Swan was competent to make a Will, but cer-
tain disclosures made by Dr. Darke and concurred in by 
Dr. Neilsen persuades me to believe that either the doctors 
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or Wilda Gail Swan or all three of them were deceived and 
confused and did not know what was going on. 
Dr. Darke based his conclusion that Wilda Gail Swan 
was competent upon his belief that she clearly understood 
and had clearly in mind the persons who were to become 
her beneficiaries. To satisfy themselves upon this point, the 
doctors asked her who were to be her beneficiaries. She 
then gave the names of seven persons, which were written 
down at that time by Dr. Darke. Those names included 
Oscar Burnside Beam, Mr. Hendee and Mr. Bridge. Yet 
all three of these persons were omitted from the Codicil 
which had been prepared, arid which was at that time exe-
cuted by Wilda Gail Swan and attested to by Drs. Darke 
and Neilsen. 
It therefore is clear to me that Wilda Gail Swan did 
not understand the disposition which was being made of 
her property, and that the Codicil signed in the Doctor's 
office did not express her free will or her intentions. There-
fore, I find that the Codicil was induced by fraud and un-
due influence and is void. 
As to Dan Kostopulos, I find that his constant and 
persistent attentions to Wilda Gail Swan and her father, 
which began in about 1949, was motivated by a desire to 
gain the trust and confidence of Wilda Gail Swan and her 
father with the intent to turn it to his own profit and ad-
vantage. I am compelled to conclude, from the appear-
ance and demeanor of Kostopulos upon the witness stand, 
that he could not be trusted or believed. Kostopulos was 
approximately 14 years younger than Miss Swan, a mar-
ried man, and yet over a period of several years he called 
upon Wilda Gail Swan almost daily, sometimes several 
times a day. In Wilda Gail Swan's home the evidence dis-
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closes that he pet and fawned upon Wilda Gail Swan in a 
manner described by the witness Grace Folden as udisgust-
ing." He pretended to be responsive in a wholly charitable 
manner to every whim and caprice of Miss Swan. He 
further pretended to be generous in the making of gifts to 
Miss Swan, and yet the evidence discloses that Kostopulos 
kept a record in minute detail of every little item which 
he acquired for and took to Wilda Gail Swan. The record 
further discloses that immediately after the death of Wilda 
Gail Swan, Kostopulos filed a claim against her estate to 
recover more than $2,000.00 which he claimed due him, 
and when this claim was rejected by the executor of the 
estate he brought suit to recover this amount. 
Confidential relationship is not necessarily derived 
from or become dependent upon the professional character 
of either party. It is not necessary, in order to establish a 
confidential relationship, that either party be a lawyer, 
physician or religious advisor. The evidence in this case 
makes it ·clear to me that Kostopulos with design and pur-
pose ingratiated himself into Wilda Gail Swan's mind, 
thereby gaining her full confidence and complete trust. 
Thus, this relationship between them thereupon became a 
confidential relationship. It was the childish Wilda Gail 
Swan who reposed confidence, and Kostopulos who became 
and continued to be the dominant member of the relation-
ship. 
It further appears that during the time when 
Kostopulos was creating and solidifying the confidential 
relationship with Wilda Gail· Swan, he sought to under-
mine in Miss Swan's mind the position and influence of 
others who might share her confidence to his disadvantage. 
The evidence discloses he sought to impair the relationship 
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between Wilda Gail Swan and her sister Mrs. Hendee. It 
appears further that he even had the hardihood to encour-
age Dr. Frank to dope up Gail Swan whenever her sister 
was about to arrive from California. The evidence further 
discloses he disliked the close relationship existing between 
Wilda Gail Swan and Mrs. Folden, and encouraged dis-
harmony between them, and finally Kostopulos called up-
on Dr. Frank to dismiss Mrs. Folden from attendance upon 
Miss Swan. He further endeavored to alienate the friend-
ly relationship existing between Wilda Gail Swan and the 
Bridges, by telling Mrs. Hendee that she must keep Miss 
Swan away from the Bridges because they were taking too 
much money from Miss Swan. 
Kostopulos denied that he knew anything about the 
Will or Codicils until Wilda Gail Swan's death. I do not 
believe this denial on his part. I am inclined to believe the 
testimony of Mr. Butler, a wholly disinterested witness, 
who upon the witness stand stated that before the death 
of Wilda Gail Swan Kostopulos had said, in substance and 
effect, that he was not worried about the condition of the 
moving picture business because he had a rich woman who 
was going to give him a hotel. At a later time the evidence 
discloses that Kostopulos identified Wilda Gail Swan to Mr. 
Butler as the woman who was going to leave him the hotel. 
I believe, and therefore find, that Kostopulos was in-
formed and knew, not only of the second Codicil, but also 
the first Codicil, because the record discloses that it was 
in the first Codicil that the property identified as a hotel 
was designated for Kostopulos. I further believe the testi-
mony of Mr. Butler, reflecting in substance that after the 
death of Wilda Gail Swan, Kostopulos stated that it was 
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a mistake on the part of Macfarlane to omit Beam from 
the Will. 
It is abundantly clear to me that from the latter part 
of 1949 until the death of Wilda Gail Swan that Kosto-
pulos maintained and preserved a confidential relationship 
with Miss Swan under which he could and did dominate 
Miss Swan's will, and that he fraudulently induced her to 
dispose of her property so as to make him the beneficiary 
of real estate having a value of approximately $100,000.00. 
The record in this case makes it clear to me that 
Kostopulos was guilty of fraud and undue influence, and 
without such fraud and influence the disposition of Wilda 
Gail Swan's property would have been otherwise than as 
designated in her first and second Codicils, and I find that 
both of said instruments are null and void. 
I conclude it is appropriate to summarize the result of 
the exploitations by Macfarlane and Kostopulos of the con-
fidential relationship which they enjoyed with Wilda Gail 
Swan. During Miss Swan's lifetime Kostopulos and Mac-
farlane each received without consideration approximately 
$9,500.00 in money and securities. Macfarlane in addition 
was compensated for legal services rendered. Kostopulos 
received with Macfarlane's approval a 10-year lease upon 
a valuable piece of business property. By the purported 
testamentary documents, Kostopulos and Macfarlane 
would each receive property appraised at nearly 
$100,000.00. In addition each was bequeathed fire insur-
ance policies, a fact which Macfarlane characterized as un-
usual. The second Codicil discloses that Macfarlane was 
designated the attorney for the estate and Kostopulos 
authorized to make the funeral arrangements. 
If the Will and Codicils were allowed to stand, Kosto-
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pulos and Macfarlane between them would profit by their 
confidential relationship with Wilda Gail Swan in an 
amount totaling about one quarter of a million dollars. To 
permit such a result in the face of the record made in the 
trial of this cause would, in my opinion, stultify the law 
and the bench and the bar. Therefore, I conclude that the 
purported Will and both Codicils must be held null and 
void, insofar as they would vest any property or thing of 
value to either Macfarlane or Kostopulos. 
This case, as it relates to the beneficiary Ada Bridge, 
presents problems of particular difficulty. I am reluctant 
to strike down the bequest of Ada Bridge. If Wilma Gail 
Swan had been permitted to dispose of her property free 
from the domination of Kostopulos and Macfarlane, so 
that her meager mental capacity might have been freely 
exercised, and if under such circumstances she had made 
the bequest to Ada Bridge which is here under attack, I 
would be strongly inclined to sustain that bequest. 
I feel constrained to find that the Will and Codicils 
are entirely void, because of the circumstances and in the 
setting in which they were signed. I do not believe that 
Wilda Gail Swan had the testamentary capacity to give ef-
fect to her own will and desires as to the disposition of her 
property. 
But even if she had testamentary capacity, considered 
in the abstract, her childish mind was so easily domina ted 
and she was so completely under the influence of Macfar-
lane and Kostopulos, who fraudulently employed that in-
fluence to bring about the signing of the documents under 
attack, and the documents were so far contaminated by 
fraud and undue influence, that they must be declared 
null and void in their entirety. 
As heretofore stated, I conclude that this contest 
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must be sustained upon both grounds alleged in the com-
plaint: 
1. That Wilda Gail Swan was incompetent to make 
the Will or Codicils. 
2. That in any event, the Will and Codicils were 
the product of and resulted from fraud and undue in-
fluence of both Macfarlane and Kostopulos. 
Counsel for the contestant are therefore requested to 
prepare and submit Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, 
and Judgment, giving effect to the views expressed here-
inbefore. 
Dated at Ogden, Utah, this 14th day of April, 1954. 
By the Court, 
PARLEY E. NORSETH 
Judge 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This case came on regularly before the court for trial 
without a jury upon the complaint and contest of plaintiff 
and contestant and the answers of the defendants. Plain-
tiff was in court and represented by her attorneys, Paul 
H. Ray and Grant C. Aadnesen. Defendant, Walker Bank 
and Trust Company, as executor, was represented by its 
attorney, Athol Rawlins. Defendant, Grant Macfarlane, 
was in ·Court and represented by his attorneys, Calvin W. 
Rawlings, Brigham E. Roberts and Wayne L. Black. De-
fendant, Daniel Kostopulos, was in court and represented 
by his attorney, N. J. Cotro Manes. Defendant, Ada 
Bridge, was in court and represented by he attorney, Le-
Grand P. Backman. 
Trial was begun on November 17, 1953, and con-
tinued on November 18, 19, 20, 23, 24 and 27, 1953. Plain-
tiff and all of the defendants, except Walker Bank and 
Trust Company, as executor, offered evidence both oral 
and documentary. After all parties had rested, all the 
parties except Walker Bank and Trust Company argued 
the case orally and thereafter submitted written briefs. 
The court listened to all of the testimony and examined 
all of the documentary evidence. The court also heard 
oral arguments of counsel and examined written briefs. 
Being fully informed upon all of the matters presented, 
the court now makes the following 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Wilda Gail Swan, hereinafter referred to as Gail 
Swan, an unmarried and childless woman, died in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on or about May 28, 1952, leaving as her sole 
surviving heir at law her sister, Theo Swan Hendee, who 
is plaintiff and contestant in these proceedings. 
2. After her death there were admitted to probate 
a document purporting to be the last will and testament 
of Gail Swan, and two documents purporting to be codi-
cils to said last will and testament. The said purported 
will and the purported codicils named Walker Bank and 
Trust Company as executor. By the will, or one or the 
other of the codicils, all of the parties hereto, except Walker 
Bank and Trust Company, were named as beneficiaries. 
After the admission to probate of said documents, and 
within the time provided by law, Theo Swan Hendee, the 
sister and sole surviving heir of Gail Swan, and one of the 
devisees mentioned in said will and codicils, filed her com-
plaint and contest by which these proceedings were ini-
tiated. 
3. When Gail Swan and her sister, Theo, were small 
children they resided with their parents, Mr. and Mrs. 
Ulysses Grant Swan, at 118 N Street, in Salt Lake City. 
Gail's father was generally referred to, and will be herein-
after referred to, as Grant Swan. Gail was, for a time, a nor-
mal child. She began her schooling in Salt Lake City in 1896 
when she was six years of age. When she was eight years 
of age, or thereabouts~ she began showing signs of nervous 
disorder manifested by a blinking and rolling of her eyes. 
When she was eleven years old she became the victim of 
epilepsy which was manifest by violent and frequent 
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seizures. It became necessary to withdraw her from school 
at about that time and she was never thereafter well enough 
to resume her schooling. Her mother and father devoted 
themselves to her care and attention, and sought medical 
advice and relief for her both locally and in eastern medi-
cal centers. Gail's health went from bad to worse, and 
she became a complete invalid unable during long periods 
of time to care for any of her personal needs. During all 
of her childhood Gail was withdrawn into the shelter of 
her parent's home and was deprived, by reason of her con-
dition, of any and all normal contacts and companionships 
common to growing children. It was impossible for her 
to engage in normal play. She had no girl friends and no 
boy friends, and therefore no opportunity for either 
mental or physical development. 
4. In or about the year 1917 when Gail was 27 years 
of age, drugs were made available to her which, if regu-
larly and frequently given, had the effect of limiting the 
frequency and the violence of epileptic seizures. But it 
was necessary that Gail continue for the rest of her life 
to be under the care of a physician and to receive medica-
tion many times each day to minimize the effects of 
epilepsy. After 1917 Gail's health improved to the extent 
that she could be up and about and get some measure of 
enjoyment out of life. She learned to read and write to 
a limited extent, and learned to play a few tunes upon the 
harp. Her life continued to be supervised in almost every 
detail by her mother and father and by housekeepers and 
companions employed for that purpose. 
5. In 1931 Gail's mother died in southern Cali-
fornia. Gail was then 41 years of age, and her father 
brought her back to the family home in Salt Lake City 
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where he and she resided until their respective deaths in 
1950 and 1952. During the years following her mother's 
death, Gail's father saw to it that there was someone liv-
ing at the house who could take care of the housekeeping 
and cooking, and assist Gail with her personal affairs. 
6. The property referred to in the will and codicils 
here involved was acquired by Gail Swan's grandfather and 
passed from him to Gail's father, who in turn deeded it 
to Gail. The property consisted mainly of buildings in 
the commercial section of Salt Lake City. Gail's father, 
with the aid of persons employed. by him for that pur-
pose, supervised the maintenance and renting of the sev-
eral parcels of property and the collection of rentals until 
a few months before his death. Management of the pro-
perty prior to Gail's death was placed with Walker Bank 
and Trust Company, a banking institution of Salt Lake 
City. 
7. After her mother's death, Gail's health further 
improved to the point that she was able to and did take 
some interest in the affairs of the family. She enjoyed 
being read to and learned to play simple card games. She 
was taught by Judge George G. Armstrong, her father's 
lawyer, to collect rentals and to determine whether she 
was being paid the right amounts. She even discussed 
leases upon property with persons employed to look after 
the property by or under the direction of her father and 
sister. But Dr. Roy A. Darke, a psychiatrist sworn as a 
witness by defendants, testified, and it is so found to be 
fact, that she was incapable mentally of understanding the 
language of a formal lease. 
8. From the time of Gail's withdrawal from school 
in 1901 until her death she was not only afflicted by ep-
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ilepsy, but she lived a life sequestered from all normal out-
side contacts, and until she formed the association with the 
defendants in this case her companionship was largely 
limited to that of her parents, her sister, her aunt, and 
hired housekeepers and companions. As the result of her 
illness and her sequestered and sheltered life, she never 
matured either mentally or emotionally. At the time she 
signed the documents involved in this action she had the 
mentality of a child from 11 to 13 years of age. She never 
reached maturity emotionally, as the result of which she 
was unusually susceptible to any show of friendship by 
any person outside of her own family. 
9. In the early part of 1950 Gail's father, Grant 
Swan, was stricken with a fatal illness from which he died 
in June of that year. 
10. The defendant, Grant Macfarlane, is a lawyer 
practicing at the bar of this court, and at the time of 
the trial had been actively engaged in his profession for a 
period of 25 years. He is a man of wide experience and 
trained intellect. He is possessed of a fine physique and 
stature, a soft and pleasant voice, and with all is possessed 
of an ingratiating personality particularly well suited to 
find favor in the eyes of such a woman as Gail Swan. 
11. In the fall of 1944 Grant Macfarlane became 
Gail Swan's attorney at law. The relation of attorney and 
client between the two came into existence at that time 
and persisted without interruption until Gail Swan's death 
in 19 52. During the years between that first meeting and 
Gail's death, Gail called frequently at Grant Macfarlane's 
office, sometimes for the discussion of business and some-
times on a social basis. For all legal services rendered by 
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Macfarlane to Gail Swan, Macfarlane rendered bills which 
were paid in full as rendered. 
12. Not long after the relationship of attorney and 
client came into being as between Gail Swan and Grant 
Macfarlane, Macfarlane became acquainted with Gail's 
father, Grant Swan, and from time to time called at the 
Swan home to visit with Gail Swan and her father. Out 
of those visits there arose the relationship of attorney and 
client between Grant Macfarlane and Grant Swan, and 
from time to time Macfarlane performed legal services 
for Grant Swan for which he was paid by Grant Swan. 
Macfarlane also be.came acquainted with Gail's sister, Theo 
Swan Hendee, who lived in San Francisco with her hus-
band. The relationship between Macfarlane and Mrs. 
Hendee became close and friendly, and the trust and con-
fidence which was imposed in Macfarlane by Mrs. Hendee 
made the relationship between them a confidential one. 
13. Theo Swan Hendee, plaintiff and contestant 
herein, was two years older that her sister, Gail, and was 
in all respects normal. She was graduated from college 
in 1912, and. in 1914 was married to Harold Hendee. She 
and her husband moved to San Francisco in 1922 and main-
tained their residence in that area until his death in 19 52. 
14. During all the years that Theo Swan Hendee 
lived in California she made frequent trips to Salt Lake 
City to visit and be with her father and Gail. Often 
when she could not come to Salt Lake City she paid the 
expenses of her aunt, Mrs. Martsolf, to go from Redlands, 
in the State of California, to Salt Lake City where she 
resided with and gave assistance to the Swan family. In 
addition to making many visits each year to the Swan home 
in Salt Lake City, Mrs. Hendee frequently wrote and fre-
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quently called by telephone. She endeavored at all times 
to be of assistance to her father and sister in connection 
not only with their domestic but their business affairs. 
It is found that one some occasions Gail Swan showed 
some irritation toward her sister, Theo, but it is also found 
that throughout their lives there was a strong, mutual 
affection and devotion between them. It is also found 
that Gail Swan had an abiding affection for her sister's 
husband, Harold Hendee. 
15. Daniel Kostopulos was for many years an oper-
ator of a motion picture theatre in Salt Lake City on 
Broadway between Main and State Streets. He became 
acquainted with Grant Swan and his daughter, Gail. He 
visited them at their home infrequently until about the 
year 1950. Beginning in 1950 the frequency of his visits 
was stepped up until he was calling there almost daily, 
and on some occasions several times a day, a practice which 
he pursued until Gail's death. He was 14 or 15 years 
younger than Gail Swan, and a married man. His con-
stant and persistent attention to Gail and her father was 
unnatural, and the court finds that it was motivated by 
a desire to gain the confidence and trust of Gail and her 
father in the hopes of financial reward. Kostopulos not 
only paid persistent and unrelenting attention to Gail, but 
he insidiously endeavored to alienate other persons from 
Gail's affection. He endeavored to plant in the mind of 
Gail that her sister was hostile to her. He was informed in 
advance from time to time when Gail's sister was planning 
a visit from California, and on such occasions he suggested 
to Dr. Emory Frank, who was Gail's attending physician, 
that Gail should be ((doped up" in advance of her sister's 
visits. Such suggestions were made by Kostopulos to Dr. 
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Frank in Gail Swan's presence. He suggested to Gail's 
sister, Mrs. Hendee, that the friendship between Gail and 
Mrs. Ada Bridge, one of the defendants herein, should be 
interfered with for fear the Bridges might get too much 
of Gail's money. The court finds that the relationship be-
tween Kostopulos and Gail Swan was such that it became 
in all respects a confidential relationship with Gail repos-
ing her full confidence and trust in Kostopulos. It is 
further found by the court that Kostopulos made fre-
quent and constant visits to Gail, and pretended to be 
her most obedient friend, for the purpose of cementing 
and securing a confidential relationship to the end that 
he might profit from his dominating position. 
16. Ada Bridge is the wife of Joseph Lamar Bridge. 
She is young enough to have been the daughter of Gail 
Swan. She and her husband maintained a small chicken 
farm in connection with their home in the south part of 
Salt Lake County. During the late war Ada Bridge's hus-
band was in the military service. While he was away Mrs. 
Bridge sold eggs and poultry and among her customers 
were Grant Swan and his daughter, Gail. She made de-
liveries from time to time and formed an acquaintance 
with Gail. After his return from the service Ada Bridge's 
husband joined his wife in visiting the Swan home. Dur-
ing the. last two years of Gail's life Ada Bridge and her 
husband visited the Swan home several nights a week, 
and on frequent occasions took Gail Swan to their home. 
The Bridges had six children and a home to look after. 
Mr. Bridge had a business to pursue. They had friends 
of their own age and with the same interests, and yet dur-
ing the last two years of Gail's life they left their home 
and their children and drove into the Swan home to play 
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cards with Gail several nights each week. Ada Bridge's 
husband was employed on at least two occasions to per-
form work in connection with the maintenance and re-
pair of some of the Swan properties. Joseph Lamar and 
Ada Bridge came to believe that Gail and her father were 
wealthy. Gail endeavored to give Ada Bridge's husband 
$3,000.00 to be used in the :finishing of a house which 
he had under construction. Mr. Bridge claims to have re-
fused to accept the money as a gift but went with her 
to the bank where she drew out of her savings account 
$3,000.00 in cash and delivered it to him. In considera-
tion for such cash Mr. Bridge claims to have written a 
note by which he promised to repay the sum. The note 
could not be produced at the trial but Mr. Bridge testi-
fied that it provided for no interest, and provided no time 
at which the repayment would become due. $2100.00 of 
the amount advanced to Mr. Bridge was never repaid, 
but credits in that amount were given to Mr. Bridge by 
Gail. The court :finds that the persistent attentions of 
the Bridges to Gail Swan was motivated by a desire to 
gain her trust and confidence in the hope of pro:fi ting from 
such show of kindness. 
17. The will admitted to probate and under attack 
in these proceedings is dated May 2, 1947. By that time 
Macfarlane had been Gail Swan's attorney at law for 
nearly three years. He must have known, and the court 
finds that he did know, not only that Gail's mind was 
childish and undeveloped, but that she was emotionally 
immature and highly susceptible to any show of kindness 
and friendship. During the period of his confidential re-
lationship with Gail Swan, Macfarlane suffered an injury 
to one of his eyes which required surgery. That difficulty 
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brought an unusual sympathy from Gail Swan and Mac-
farlane employed the difficulty with his eyes to play upon 
the sympathy and emotions of his client. 
18. The will was drawn by defendant Macfarlane 
in his office. On that occasion Gail called at Macfarlane's 
office entirely alone. She brought with her a prior will 
under the terms of which she bequeathed and devised her 
estate to her father. Macfarlane then and there prepared 
the will now under attack and caused it to be attested 
by two witnesses of his own selection, one of whom was 
his private secretary. By the terms of that will he was 
made the beneficiary of property having a value of nearly 
$100,000.00. At the time the will was prepared by Mac-
farlane and signed by Gail Swan she had no independent 
advice of any kind, but relied solely for advice upon Mac-
farlane. 
19. The first codicil admitted to probate and now 
under attack is dated February 20, 1950. Between the 
signing of the will of May 2, 1947, and the signing of the 
first codicil on February 20, 1950, there had been no in-
terruption in or weakening of the confidential relationship 
between Macfarlane and Gail Swan. On the contrary, the 
relationship had continued and as time went on Gail Swan's 
trust and confidence in Grant Macfarlane increased. 
20. The first codicil was signed under the same cir-
cumstances surrounding the signing of the will of May 2, 
1947. Gail Swan went to Macfarlane's law office alone. 
Macfarlane there drew the first codicil and had it attested 
by his secretary and a lawyer who occupied space in the 
same suite. The lawyer who witnessed the will did not 
know its contents and never gave Gail Swan any advice 
in connection therewith. Gail Swan had no independent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX XXV 
advice of any kind in connection with the signing of the 
codicil, and by the codicil Macfarlane was designated as 
the beneficiary of property worth more than $100,000.00. 
21. In the month of April, 1950, two months after 
the signing of the first codicil, Macfarlane prepared and 
caused Gail Swan to sign and deliver to him a full and 
general power of attorney making him her attorney-in-
fact. Following the execution and delivery to Macfarlane 
of the power of attorney, and following the death of 
Gail Swan's father, Macfarlane, as attorney-in-fact, caused 
certain changes to be made with respect to funds on de-
posit in the name of Gail Swan and her father in the 
Union Trust Company in Salt Lake City. After the 
changes were made by Macfarlane as attorney-in-fact there 
were three joint accounts-one in the name of Gail Swan 
or Grant Macfarlane in the sum of $4797.50, one in the 
name of Gail Swan and Daniel Kostopulos and his wife 
in the sum of $4797.50, and one in the name of Gail Swan, 
or Theo Swan Hendee, or H. C. Hendee in the sum of 
$4887.67. During her lifetime the accounts, except those 
in the name of Macfarlane and Kostopulos were substan-
tially depleted, while only insignificant withdrawals were 
made in the names of Macfarlane and Kostopulos. At the 
time of Gail's death the amounts still on deposit in the 
names of Macfarlane and Kostopulos were exactly the same 
-$4597.17 each. 
22. As attorney-in-fact and attorney at law and 
confidential adviser, Macfarlane approved the sale of a 
piece of unimproved real estate by Gail Swan, the pro-
ceeds of which were invested in corporate stocks and U. S. 
Government bonds. The stocks and bonds consisted of 
100 shares of stock of Utah Power and Light Company, 
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80 shares of Westinghouse Electric Company, and $3000.00 
par value of U.S. Government bonds. As attorney-in-fact 
for Gail Swan, Macfarlane took delivery from Walker 
Bank and Trust Company of the corporate stock of Utah 
Power and Light and Westinghouse Electric Company. 
Thereafter, and in the month of April, 1951, Macfarlane 
received from Gail Swan the 8 0 shares of Westinghouse 
Electric Company of the value of approximately $3000.00, 
and $1500.00 per value of U. S. Government bonds. He 
also caused the shares of Utah Power and Light Company 
to be transferred from the name of Gail Swan to the name 
of Daniel Kostopulos, and permitted Gail Swan to deliver 
the Utah Power and Light stock of the approximate value 
of $3000.00 and $1500.00 par value of U. S. bonds to 
Daniel Kostopulos. The court finds that acceptance of 
the stock and bonds from Gail Swan by Macfarlane and 
Kostopulos was entirely without consideration and was 
in furtherance of their design and purpose to abuse their 
confidential relationship with Gail Swan and procure her 
property for their own benefit. 
23. The second codicil to Gail Swan's will is dated 
April23, 1951. By then Macfarlane had been Gail Swan's 
attorney at law and confidential friend and business ad-
viser for nearly seven years. The confidential nature of 
their relationship had been made stronger as the years went 
by, and Gail Swan's trust and confidence in Macfarlane 
was complete. He had then been her attorney in fact for 
one year. He knew that Gail was then immature both 
mentally and emotionally. He also knew that Daniel Kos-
topulos had acquired a highly confidential relationship to 
Gail Swan, and that he was a serious rival for Gail's gener-
osity. He and Kostopulos were by that time doubtful of 
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Gail's mental capacity to make a testamentary disposition 
of her property. Macfarlane prepared the second codicil 
and on this occasion, as on all others, Gail had no inde-
pendent advice with respect to the disposition of her pro-
perty. Instead of having office help attest the second codi-
cil, Macfarlane made an appointment with a doctor who 
was a total stranger to Gail Swan, and entirely unac-
quainted with her illness. He arranged to have an exam-
ination made by Dr. A. M. Nielsen. He then arranged 
to have Kostopulos bring Gail Swan to Dr. Nielsen's office 
where she could be examined and where she could sign 
the will. Kostopulos took Gail to Dr. Nielsen's office where 
Macfarlane was waiting for them. Dr. Nielsen made a 
physical examination. He then called in Dr. Roy A. 
Darke, and the two of them examined Gail_ Swan and then 
and there signed the second codicil as attesting witnesses. 
Macfarlane and Kostopulos were both present when the 
second codicil was signed, but were not present during 
some of the conversations between the doctors and Gail 
Swan. When they were not in the actual presence of 
Gail Swan they were in the adjoining room, and the effect 
of their influence upon Gail Swan was never dissipated. 
24. Drs. Darke and Nielsen both testified that Gail 
Swan was competent to sign the codicil for the reason that 
she understood the nature of her property and had clearly 
in mind the persons who were to benefit by her will. They 
both testified that upon inquiry of Gail Swan as to who 
were to be beneficiaries under her will she gave them the 
name of Oscar Burnside Beam, her brother-in-law Harold 
Hendee, and Ada Bridge's husband, Joseph Lamar Bridge. 
All three persons so named by Gail Swan as she was about 
to sign the codicil were omitted from the codicil. The 
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court therefore finds that Gail Swan did not understand 
who was benefitting by the second codicil she had signed 
in Dr. Nielsen's office, and that document which she signed 
did not give effect to the testamentary intentions expressed 
by her to the doctors at the very time she signed the codi-
cils. 
25. The court finds that at the time when Gail Swan 
signed the will on May 2, 1947, she was under the influence 
and domination of Grant Ma.cfarlane; that her mentality 
was too weak to withstand the effect of such influence; that 
she therefore lacked testamentary capacity to make the 
will. The court further finds that the will was the result 
of the undue influence of Grant Macfarlane. 
2 6. The court finds that when the first codicil was 
made on February 20, 1950, Gail Swan did not have mental 
capacity to make a testamentary disposition of her proper-
ty because her childish and immature mind was unable to 
resist, and could not resist, the domination and influence 
of Macfarlane. The court further finds that said codicil 
was produced by the undue influence of Macfarlane. 
27. The court finds that when the second codicil was 
made on the 23rd day of April, 1951, Gail Swan was under 
the influence and domination of Macfarlane and Kosta-
pulos, and did not have the mental capacity to make a 
testamentary disposition of her property. The court fur-
ther finds that said codicil did not express the free and vol-
untary will of Gail Swan, but was the ·result of undue in-
fluence then and there practiced upon her by Macfarlane 
and Kostopulos. 
28. The court finds that the relationship between 
Ada Bridge and her husband on the one side, and Gail Swan 
on the other, was a confidential relationship. The will .and 
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both codicils were prepared by Macfarlane, and Kostopulos 
participated in the preparation and execution of the second 
codicil. Neither Ada Bridge nor her husband, Joseph La-
mar Bridge, participated in the preparation of the will or 
either of the codicils, but the court finds that the bequest 
to Ada Bridge was the result of undue influence exercised 
upon Gail Swan by Ada and Joseph Lamar Bridge, who 
occupied a confidential relationship with Gail. 
29. The court finds that the will and both of the 
codicils were the result of fraud and undue influence and 
therefore did not express the free and voluntary will of 
Gail Swan. 
30. The court finds that Gail Swan's mind was so 
undeveloped that under the circumstances and in the set-
ting surrounding the signing of the will and the two codi-
cils under attack in these proceedings, she was unable to 
give any free and independent exercise to what mentality 
she had and was, therefore, mentally incompetent and 
lacked testamentary capacity to execute and make a valid 
testamentary disposition of her property at the time she 
signed the purported will and each of the codicils. 
31. The court finds that at the time Gail Swan 
signed the will of May 2, 1947, she was so far under the 
influence and domination of Grant Macfarlane that said 
will was the product of Macfarlane's influence and ex-
pressed his will and desire and not the will and desire of 
Gail Swan. 
32. The court finds that when the codicils of Feb-
ruary 20, 1950, and April 23, 1951, were signed by Gail 
Swan, she was so far under the influence and domination 
of Macfarlane and Kostopulos that such codicils were the 
product of Macfarlane's and Kostopulos' influence, and ex-
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pressed the wills and desires of Macfarlane and Kostopulos 
and not the will and desires of Gail Swan. By reason of 
their confidential relationship to Gail Swan, and the com-
plete confidence and trust she put in them, they were able 
to and did substitute their wills for hers. 
33. The court finds that while Ada Bridge took no 
active part in the preparation of the will or either codicil, 
all three documents were prepared by Macfarlane, and 
Kostopulos was present and participated in the events lead-
ing up to and including the signing of the second codicil. 
The purported will and first codicil were so far a product 
of undue influence of Macfarlane, and the second codicil 
was so far the product of undue influence of Macfarlane 
and Kostopulos, that none of such documents would have 
been signed except for such undue influence. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes 
the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. At the time the said Wilda Gail Swan signed the 
purported will on May 2, 1947, she was mentally incom-
petent and lacked testamentary capacity to make and ex-
ecute a valid will, and said will is and should be declared 
null and void. 
2. That when Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported 
will of May 2, 1947, she was so far dominated by the in-
fluen.ce of Grant Macfarlane that he was able to and did 
substitute his will for hers. The will was, therefore, the 
product of undue influence exercised upon Wilda Gail 
Swan by Grant Macfarlane, and is and should be declared 
null and void. 
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APPENDIX XXXI 
3. That at the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the pur-
ported first codicil on February 20, 1950, she was mentally 
incompetent and lacked testementary capacity to execute 
a valid will or codicil, and the said codicil is and should 
be declared null and void. 
4. When Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported first 
codicil of February 20, 1950, she was so far dominated by 
the influence of Grant Macfarlane that he was able to and 
did substitute his will for hers. The codicil was therefore 
the product of undue influence exercised by Grant Mac-
farlane at the time he prepared the codicil and at the time 
she signed the same. Said codicil is and should be declared 
null and void. 
5. At the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the purport-
ed second codicil she was mentally incompetent and lacked 
testamentary capacity to execute a valid will or codicil, and 
the said codicil is and should be declared null and void. 
6. At the time Wilda Gail Swan signed the purport-
ed second codicil she was so far dominated by the influence 
of Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kostopulos that they were 
able to and did substitute their wills for hers. The said 
second codicil was therefore the product of undue influ-
ence exercised by Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kostopulos, 
and should be declared null and void. 
7. The purported will and first codicil under attack 
in these proceedings did not and do not express the will of 
Wilda Gail Swan, but express the will and purpose of Grant 
Macfarlane; and the purported second codicil did not and 
does not express the will of Wilda Gail Swan, but expresses 
the will and purpose of Grant Macfarlane, Daniel Kosta-
pulos and Ada and Joseph Lamar Bridge. At the time Wil-
da Gail Swan signed the purported will and each of the 
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codicils she was mentally incompetent and lacking testa-
mentary capacity to execute a valid will or codicil. The 
purported will and the purported codicils thereto should 
be declared and adjudged to be null and void and of no 
force or effect, and the estate of which Wilda Gail Swan 
died seized, both real and personal, should be distributed 
to Theo Swan Hendee, the natural sister and sole heir of 
Wilda Gail Swan, deceased. 
8. Theo Swan Hendee, plaintiff and contestant, is 
entitled to a judgment that the purported will of Wilda 
Gail Swan, dated May 2, 1947, and the two purported 
codicils thereto dated February 20, 1950, and April 23, 
19 51, respectively, are null and void and of no force or 
effect. She is further entitled to a judgment ordering and 
directing the distribution of the entire estate of Wilda Gail 
Swan to her, subject only to the payment of taxes, debts 
and the costs of probate. She is entitled to have judgment 
for her costs herein expended. 
Dated this 14th day of May, 1954. 
Parley E. Norseth 
JUDGE 
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JUDGMENT 
The court has heretofore made, signed and filed its 
separate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the 
above entitled case from which it appears that Theo Swan 
Hendee, plaintiff and contestant, is entitled to a judgment 
of this court that the purported will of Wilda Gail Swan 
and both of the codicils thereto are null and void and of no 
force or effect, and that the entire estate of Wilda Gail 
Swan should be distributed in accordance with the prayer 
of plaintiff's complaint. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED and 
AD JUDGED that the purported will of Wilda Gail Swan, 
dated May 2, 1947, and the two purported codicils thereto 
dated February 20, 1950, and April 23, 1951, respectively, 
are null and void and of no force or effect. 
It is further ORDERED and AD JUDGED that all of 
the estate of which Wilda Gail Swan died seized and pos-
sessed, both real and personal, be distributed to Theo Swan 
-Hendee, the natural sister and only heir of the said Wilda 
Gail Swan, deceased, provided that such distribution shall 
be subject to the payment of taxes and costs of probate. 
It is further ORDERED and DECREED that plain-
tiff have and recover her costs herein incurred. 
Dated this 14th day of May, 1954. 
Parley E. Norseth 
JUDGE 
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